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This paper tests a model in which group identity in the form of religious intensity functions as ex post insurance. I exploit relative price
shocks induced by the Indonesian financial crisis to demonstrate a
causal relationship between economic distress and religious intensity
(Koran study and Islamic school attendance) that is weaker for other
forms of group identity. Consistent with ex post insurance, credit availability reduces the effect of economic distress on religious intensity,
religious intensity alleviates credit constraints, and religious institutions smooth consumption shocks across households and within
households, particularly for those who were less religious before the
crisis.

I.

Introduction

Despite an explosion of policy interest in association with recent events,
religious intensity appears poorly understood. What causes religious
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intensity? Does economic distress stimulate religious intensity? Is it economics or distress that stimulates religious intensity? Does religious intensity function as social insurance, distinctive from other insurance
mechanisms in that religious groups help people who experience negative shocks after the fact whereas other insurance mechanisms require
participation before the fact? How would such an ex post insurance
mechanism be self-sustaining, and how does it compare with other insurance mechanisms during crises? These are some of the questions
that this paper seeks to address. Social scientists have long speculated
on the connection between economic forces and religious intensity;
answers to these questions may suggest appropriate policies to address
ideological extremism.
This paper uses the Indonesian financial crisis to estimate the causal
impact of economic distress on communal Koran study (pengajian) and
Islamic school attendance (for children) and to provide evidence consistent with a model of religious intensity functioning as social insurance.
Between 1997 and 1998, Indonesia’s rupiah fell dramatically from 2,400
to the U.S. dollar to 16,000 to the U.S. dollar, and the consumer price
index (CPI) for food increased from 100 to 261. My empirical strategy
exploits the fact that relative price shocks induced by the crisis favored
growers of staples, namely rice, and hurt sticky wage earners, particularly
government employees whose salaries are set by federal law. Because
precrisis wetland hectares and government occupation are unlikely to
be correlated with changes in religious intensity other than through
economic distress, the interaction of the crisis and wetland hectares and
the interaction of the crisis and government occupation create exogenous variation in economic distress that can be used to estimate the
causal impact of economic distress on religious intensity. Dryland hectares and service occupation serve as “placebo instruments” to test
whether unobservables common with both wetland and dryland hectares
or with both government and service occupations are correlated with
changes in religious intensity.
In the following sections, I present an analysis of data from the Hundred Villages Survey, a panel of 8,140 households followed by the Indonesian Central Statistics Office before and after the crisis and in which
religious intensity is measured using Koran study and the sending of
one’s children to Islamic school. Section II discusses a theory of religious
intensity functioning as ex post social insurance. Section III establishes
that wetland hectares and government occupation are indeed related
to economic distress during the crisis. The price of rice increased by
up to 280 percent, whereas in comparison, prices of nonstaples increased by less or even fell during the crisis (Levinsohn, Berry, and
Friedman 2003). Therefore, the more wetland a household owns, the
smaller the decrease in nonfood expenditure. In contrast, real wages
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fell on the order of 40 percent (Smith et al. 2002), so households headed
by a government employee, whose salaries tend to be inflexible in the
short run (Knowles, Pernia, and Racelis 1999), report larger decreases
in nonfood expenditure.
The variety of evidence presented in Section III establishes that the
financial crisis differentially affected wetland owners and government
employees during the crisis. In Section IV, I consider whether households suffering greater economic distress increase religious intensity.
Two-stage least squares estimates using this variation suggest that households that suffer more economic distress significantly increase religious
intensity whereas those that suffer less economic distress significantly
decrease religious intensity relative to other households. The estimates
indicate that households that suffer a $1.00 decline in monthly nonfood
per capita expenditures are roughly 2 percentage points more likely to
increase Koran study. The average household suffered a $4.70 decline
in monthly nonfood per capita expenditures out of a precrisis average
of $7.34.
I also look at the effect of economic distress on the number of children
that households send to Islamic schools. In spite of the fact that Islamic
schools in my sample are substantially more expensive than non-Islamic
schools (and have lower returns to education [Berman and Stepanyan
2003]), Islamic school attendance of affected households increases relative to the attendance of less affected households. These results suggest
that religious intensity increases with economic distress and, perhaps as
a consequence, intergenerational religious intensity as well.
I then explore why economic distress stimulates religious intensity.
Family deaths, in particular, deaths of infants, do not stimulate religious
intensity. Moreover, economic distress does not stimulate participation
in other social activities (including rotating savings groups, an alternative insurance mechanism). These results indicate that something
particular about economic distress, not distress more generally, stimulates religious intensity and that religious intensity provides something
distinctive that other social activities or insurance mechanisms do not
provide, such as the provision of ex post insurance. To shed further
light on whether Koran study is merely a leisure activity and households
have more leisure, I investigate the effect of economic distress on labor
supply. Households suffering more economic distress work slightly more
hours per week. These results are inconsistent with opportunity cost of
time models of religion that do not account for social insurance since
falling wages do not increase participation in other social activities and
households have less time for religious activity.
In Section V, I turn to the evidence for religious intensity as social
insurance. Religious intensity during the peak of the crisis alleviates the
need for alms or credit in order to meet basic daily needs: households
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that increase participation in Koran study during the crisis see a 49
percent reduction in the likelihood of needing alms or credit 4 months
later, whereas households that decrease participation see a 21 percent
reduction in the likelihood of needing alms or credit 4 months later;
those that did not participate are only 6 percent less likely to need alms
or credit 4 months later. Second, I find that religious institutions facilitate consumption smoothing among villagers by reducing the spread
of consumption shocks among villagers during the crisis. This finding
is identified by interacting the precrisis number of worship buildings
with the Gini coefficient of wetland ownership as an instrument for the
impact of the crisis on the standard deviation of consumption shocks
(since wetland ownership cushions households, the Gini coefficient of
wetland instruments for the inequality of cushions). Third, religious
institutions also reduce the effect of income shocks on consumption
shocks: religious institutions mitigate the relationship between the instruments for economic distress and economic distress. However, religious institutions cushion consumption shocks more for households that
were previously less religious before the crisis as measured by whether
any household members attended Islamic school or the haj.
Importantly, the effect of economic distress on religious intensity essentially disappears in places where credit is available in the form of
banks, microfinance institutions, or Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) loan
products. The role of religion as a provider of insurance is broadly
consistent with club goods theory (Buchanan 1965; Iannaccone 1992;
Berman 2000; Scotchmer 2002), which posits the existence of local
public goods, such as mutual insurance and in-group altruism, that are
excluded for nongroup members (Chen and Li 2009).
Religious intensity provides a particularly apt context to study group
identity since it is likely more of a choice than ethnicity. Several authors
have found significantly negative impacts of ethnic-religious conflicts
on economic outcomes (e.g., Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Abadie
and Gardeazabal 2003). The opposite direction of causality has also
begun to attract attention and spark debate (e.g., Wolfensohn [2003]
vs. Krueger and Maleckova [2003] on whether economic conditions
cause terrorism). This paper also contributes to the literature on the
determinants of religion, which has received a recent boost with the
work of Gruber (2004, 2005), Barro and McCleary (2006), and Glaeser
and Sacerdote (2008), and the literature on consumption smoothing
(households can smooth through borrowing and lending, through storage, through transfers in family networks, or through religious participation) and insurance (Townsend 1994). Together with the finding
that religious intensity is more strongly linked to social violence in
regions that are more economically distressed (Chen 2007), these results
suggest that to the extent that governments, international organizations,
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and nongovernmental organizations are concerned about ideological
extremism, increasing the provision of social insurance may mitigate
fundamentalist tendencies.

II.

Religion and Economics

A.

Indonesia Background

Of Indonesia’s population of 230 million, 87 percent is Muslim, making
it the country with the largest (Sunni) Muslim population in the world.
The primary measure of religious intensity being studied is pengajian,
which specifically refers to communal Koran study. In my sample, 61
percent of households report participating in pengajian in August 1998,
and this increases to 71 percent in August 1999. The second measure
of religious intensity being studied is the sending of one’s children to
Islamic school. In a nationwide survey, 18 percent of Muslim households
with school-age children sent their children to Islamic school in 1997
(Indonesian Family Life Survey [IFLS]), which increases to 30 percent
in 1999 (Wagner 1999).

1.

Pengajian

In most Islamic denominations, the Koran is kept in its strictest form,
meaning that it cannot be translated. During pengajian, a group gathers
to read the Koran together in Arabic, discussing both the translation
and the meaning. A leader is responsible for translating and applying
the Koran to the real world in a lecture format. Lessons on how to live
and perspectives on contemporary events are common material for discussion. Pengajian can become politicized, though it usually focuses on
general religious and social doctrine. Geertz (1960) observes one pengajian meeting in which a speaker exhorts on the importance of attending and organizing, ridiculing those who only sit and pray, thinking
about the next world and doing nothing else: “The Prophet not only
prayed but prayed and acted” (169). In Geertz’s view, pengajian tends
to be a kind of rally, where speakers exhort listeners in the most general
terms to rouse up and do something. More recent ethnographic observations of a women’s pengajian group suggest a modernizing trend
(Kipp 1993). A leader begins the women’s meetings with 40 minutes of
responsive reading, in which she gives a sentence and then the group
responds, all in Arabic. The leader reads from Arabic, but most follow
her in a book of Latin-script transcriptions. Some simply work from
memory. The teacher then talks for 30–40 minutes, sometimes expounding on a verse from the Koran, sometimes giving moral instruction.
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Instruction can be directive and social sanctions against nongroup members or nonparticipants implicit.
Individuals can attend multiple pengajians. Each mosque has multiple
pengajians. There are local and regional pengajians. They can meet
more often than once per week. According to personal interviews, individuals attend to avoid social sanctions, such as shaming, from their
neighborhood. The typical number of participants depends on village
size and the number of Muslims and imams. Men and women may attend
pengajian together, although there is typically a separation between
them. Pengajians for children and teenagers usually number around
25–50 people. Adult pengajians can have 50–80 villagers (Kim 2007).
A separate pengajian exists for children to teach them how to read the
Koran. Not every Muslim knows how to read Arabic, nor does every
participant need to be able to read Arabic since participants will be
taught the language if necessary.
Pengajian participation is strongly correlated with all measures of
religious intensity available in my data. The correlation is strong and
positive both unconditionally and conditionally on household characteristics and village fixed effects. Pengajian participation in August 1998
is correlated with the number of children attending Islamic school at
5 percent significance, with the number of adults who attended Islamic
school as children at 1 percent significance, with owning a Koran at 1
percent significance, and with worshipping in December 1998 at 1 percent significance. Moreover, these religious intensity measures are
strongly correlated with communal violence in the Database on Social
Violence in Indonesia 1990–2001 (Chen 2007).
2.

Islamic School

Islamic schools come in a wide variety, but one commonality is their
being sought by parents who wish their children to become good Muslims. Formal public education in Indonesia is provided by two main
national networks: secular and religious. The three levels of public madrasah studied in my sample are called ibtidaiyah, tsanawiyah, and aliyah.
These are Islamic madrasah that educate students at the elementary,
junior secondary, and senior secondary levels, respectively, and are statecertified as meeting the education requirements for degree-granting
institutions. The proportions of secular and religious subjects in these
madrasah vary, but the Ministry of Religious Affairs sets a standard of
70 percent for secular and 30 percent for religious subjects. Returns to
schooling at Islamic schools (pesantren or madrasah) are lower than at
non-Islamic schools (Berman and Stepanyan 2003).
Madrasah and pesantren are different. Madrasah are considered a
complement to, not a substitute for, pesantren because of the perception
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that madrasah are inferior to pesantren in the transmission of religious
knowledge, so attendance in madrasah and pesantren may be correlated.
Parents with additional means and who are more concerned with bettering their children’s religious education prefer to send them to pesantren (Muhaimin 2006). Under the direction of a Muslim scholar,
pesantren are attended by young people who are taught a detailed
understanding of the Koran, the Arabic language, the Sharia, and Muslim traditions and history. Students can enter and leave any time of the
year, and the studies are not organized as a progression of courses
leading to graduation ( Jay 1969; Library of Congress 1992). Geertz
(1960) writes of one pesantren in which young men aged 6–25 spend
part of every day chanting the Koran and part of it working in the
leader’s fields. Attendance is not mandatory, and there is no fixed schedule as long as a young man earns his keep and creates no behavior
problems. Private education is typically more organized and more expensive and sometimes for the elite, though traditional pesantren may
be free, sponsored by organizations or wealthy individuals (Nelles 2003).
In my sample, parents report paying substantially larger fees at Islamic
schools than at non-Islamic schools.
Sending one’s children to Islamic school is correlated with stronger
forms of religious belief. Bearing in mind that answers to direct questions on attitude or belief suffer from cognitive bias with unknown error
distribution (Greenwald and Banaji 1995; Bertrand and Mullainathan
2001), I correlate Islamic school attendance with indirect measures of
beliefs in the IFLS. Whether a household has ever sent a child to Islamic
school is correlated with religious opposition to contraception at 5 percent significance; the fraction of households with religious opposition
to contraception is 0.10. Religious opposition to contraception is a
dummy for answering, without prompting, religious reasons for “Why
do you not use contraception?” Whether a household has ever sent a
child to Islamic school is correlated with religious fatalism in the desired
number of sons at 0.051 with 10 percent significance; the fraction of
households with religious fatalism in the desired number of sons is 0.26.
Religious fatalism in the desired number of sons is a dummy for answering “It is up to God” in response to “What is your ideal number of
sons?” This answer is also not prompted by the survey. In sum, sending
one’s children to Islamic school is strongly correlated with observable
measures of beliefs arguably hewing closer to a literal interpretation of
a religious text.
B.

Model Description

A growing body of empirical work by economists documents a semiformal social insurance existing on the basis of religious obligation (Gruber
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and Hungerman 2005; Hungerman 2005; Dehejia, DeLeire, and Luttmer 2007). Berman (2000) notes that the degree of mutual insurance
(in the Ultra-Orthodox sect in Israel) probably exceeds that of traditional Indian villages studied by Townsend (1994). Berman writes, citing
Landau (1993), that no sick members are without visitors and that if
members donate time and money, they can receive free services for
burial, assistance for new babies or the elderly in their household, and
interest-free loans from hundreds to thousands of dollars. Social insurance, however, is not limited to those who participate ex ante. Personal
interviews conducted in Indonesia suggest that religious organizations
help individuals after they experience negative income shocks. One
Islamic school reported increasing attendance during the crisis by offering scholarships to students who could no longer afford public school
fees. Moreover, one pengajian group facilitated ex post insurance by
rapidly increasing membership and matching individuals seeking employment and employers seeking workers through public announcements.
In an earlier version of the paper (Chen 2009), I illustrate in a simple
model how religion can provide ex post social insurance. I model group
identity in the form of religious intensity as representing the degree of
social insurance in which people participate. Recent experimental evidence documents that induced group identity increases the degree of
altruism toward in-group members (Chen and Li 2009). But what sustains groups that immediately help those who join after receiving a
negative shock? I posit that religious groups are able to provide ex post
insurance (insurance after some but not all information is revealed)
and break even in their budget because social sanctions overcome the
individual rationality constraints that would otherwise prevent ex post
insurance groups from forming. Economists have noted that social pressure and individual guilt can work as enforcement mechanisms for social
insurance (Fafchamps 2004). Guilt is nurtured through religious and
family education, but more formal enforcement mechanisms are implemented by organized groups that fund social insurance programs
(Ellsworth 1989). A strong form of social sanction toward those who
belong to other religious organizations or are less religiously intense,
provided in the doctrine of many religions, including those in Indonesia
(Muhaimin 2006), facilitates religion’s function as ex post insurance by
encouraging people who receive positive shocks to participate. Mutual
insurance groups without such strong social sanctions, such as rotating
savings groups, will be less stable during periods of extraordinary
volatility.
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Qualitative Evidence

The role of charity and insurance in Islam in Indonesia has been noted
in a survey of the religious studies literature (Marty and Appleby 1991–
95). Religious leaders organize charities, administer mosque funds, seed
Koran study groups, and run Islamic boarding schools (Hadiwinata
2003). Religious leaders also frequently act as patrons for villagers seeking employment or credit, accentuating their role as social insurance
providers (Schiller 1996). Over 2,600 Islamic boarding schools on Java
have both economic and social programs aiding community development (Moran 1996), and Islamic charities have been tied to terrorist
groups, such as al-Qaeda (Burr and Collins 2006).
Pengajian, while not the sole forum through which social insurance
occurs in Indonesian villages, appears to act as the nexus for the religious provision of social insurance. Donations to the mosque typically
occur during pengajian (even though pengajians can be held away
from the mosque, in any public or private space). Donations can be
used to build new mosques, maintain current mosques, pay salaries,
or help people in need. The role of monetary contributions has been
noted by ethnographers (Kipp 1993), the World Bank, and surveys.
The World Bank describes pengajian as follows: “Activities include
reading and discussions from religious texts and communal prayers,
together with savings and credit activities and sharing of concerns.
Those who happen to have met with misfortunes can share their problems at the Pengajian and hope to find caring listeners and may even
receive small amounts of material assistance” (Mukherjee 1999, 94).
In a survey on how households cope with poverty, pengajian is the
only community institution that received a high rating by all groups,
rural and urban, men and women. According to Mukherjee’s report,
it was ranked higher in importance and effectiveness than arisan (savings and loan cooperation).
Pengajian donations accumulate to a sizable amount, a large fraction
of which is devoted to charity. A recent ethnography estimates that half
a million rupiah was collected between 1987 and 1988 (Kim 2007). In
my own field work, I collected balance sheet data showing donations,
attendance, and social welfare spending by one religious group in Banjarnegara, one of the villages in the Hundred Villages Survey. Charitable
expenditures amount to 35 percent of total donations. For comparison,
in the United States, up to 20–25 percent of church expenditures are
for charitable purposes, exceeding $24 billion in philanthropic services
annually (Biddle 1992; Gruber and Hungerman 2005).
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Design of the Study
Data

The empirical analysis draws from the Hundred Villages Survey, collected by the Indonesian Central Statistics Office. The panel data set
follows 8,140 households from May 1997 to August 1999, beginning
before the crisis and continuing in four waves after the crisis (fig. 1).
Pengajian is measured using the response to “In the past 3 months, has
your household increased, decreased, stayed the same, or not participated in the study of Koran (pengajian)?” This question is asked right
after the peak of the crisis in August 1998 and is coded as ⫹1/0/⫺1.
Nonparticipation is coded along with staying the same as 0. The main
results do not change when nonparticipation is coded as ⫺0.5 or when
it is excluded. In some specifications, I also code separately increase
versus stay the same or decrease and decrease versus stay the same or
increase. All households are able to increase participation since mosques
have multiple pengajians, villages have multiple mosques, pengajians
can meet multiple times per week, and individuals can attend local as
well as regional pengajians.
The measure of economic distress I focus on is change in monthly
per capita nonfood consumption expenditures instead of food consumption expenditures because the data do not distinguish consumption expenditures for home-grown food; the data provide only a category
for food expenditures more generally. Change in total (nonfood and
food) per capita consumption expenditures is a poorer measure of distress because landowners able to grow their own food do not need to
pay market prices for food and may substitute toward consuming privately grown agricultural products. Wetland hectares (and dryland hectares) are in fact correlated, conditionally and unconditionally, with
larger than average decreases in per capita food expenditures even
though they are correlated, conditionally and unconditionally, with
smaller than average decreases in per capita nonfood expenditures.
Government workers have larger decreases in both per capita nonfood
and food expenditures.
Since consumption is the only available economic variable (income
is not available for all households in the data set), I use consumption
as a proxy for economic welfare. I instrument for consumption using
two measures of income shock: the amount of wetland holding and
government occupation. Pengajian is recorded only after the crisis, so
I cannot examine whether precrisis pengajian participation mitigates
the effect of income shocks on consumption shocks as a Townsend
(1994) insurance test, but I do examine whether other religious institutions measured before the crisis, such as religious worship buildings

Fig. 1.—Timing of 100 villages and Potensial Desa (Village Potential Statistics; PODES) survey waves and the Rp/USD exchange rate
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and whether a household was more religiously committed with members
attending Islamic school or the haj, affect consumption smoothing.
The measure for change in religious intensity comes from May 1998
to August 1998 since the pengajian question refers to the past 3 months,
whereas the measure for income shock comes from differencing expenditures in May 1997 and August 1998 (see fig. 1). However, as the
time series in figure 1 suggests, half of the sharp increase in rupiah per
U.S. dollar (Rp/USD) occurs in the 3 months before August 1998. The
CPI index for foodstuffs also sharply increases relative to the general
CPI index during this time period. Therefore, the manner in which
wetland owners and government workers are disproportionately affected
by the relative price shocks should still apply for the 3 months before
August 1998. The results are qualitatively the same using a CPI index
or the Rp/USD exchange rate to normalize to dollars. The data set and
remaining variable construction are described in greater detail in Appendix A.

B.

Identification Strategy and Specifications

The correlation between economic variables and religious intensity is
generally difficult to interpret since the causality may run in both directions and the relationship may reflect omitted variables. I therefore
use the financial crisis to identify a discontinuous change in economic
conditions.
Consider the following linear specification for latent religiosity:
Q*ijt p bE ijt ⫹ a 0t ⫹ a1t X ij ⫹ djt ⫹ u i ⫹ ijt
for t p 1, 2, i p 1, … , N, and j p 1, … , J,

(1)

where Q*ijt represents religious intensity for individual i in village j at
time t, E ijt represents monthly per capita nonfood expenditures, X ij
represents a set of precrisis control variables (household head characteristics: age, education, gender, ever married, literate, follows media
[television or radio]; and household characteristics: size, modernity [index of owning a stove, radio, television, refrigerator, satellite dish, motorbike, and car], farming dummy, service dummy, hectares of dryland
owned, and precrisis monthly per capita nonfood expenditures),1 djt
represents village time fixed effects, and u i represents household fixed
effects. The subscript t on a1t allows the effect of precrisis control variables X ij to vary over time.
1

Construction of these variables is described in App. A.
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Taking first differences (implicit individual fixed effects) results in
DQ*ij p bDE ij ⫹ (a 02 ⫺ a 01) ⫹ (a12 ⫺ a11) X ij ⫹ gj ⫹ qij
for i p 1, … , N and j p 1, … , J,
where DQ*ij represents changes in religious intensity for individual i
in village j, DE ij represents changes in monthly per capita nonfood
expenditures, gj p dj 2 ⫺ dj1 represents village fixed effects, and qij p
ij 2 ⫺ ij1.
In practice, DQ*ij is unobserved. Instead, I observe DQ ij , which denotes
increase, decrease, or no change in Koran study. In particular, I first
estimate the linear probability specification
DQ ij p bDE ij ⫹ c ⫹ a  X ij ⫹ gj ⫹ ij ,

(2)

where DQ ij represents changes in Koran study for individual i in village
j, gj represents village fixed effects, and c is a constant. Because DQ ij has
the following ordered structure,
⫺1
DQ ij p 0
1

{

if DQ*ij ≤ m 1
if m1 ≤ DQ*ij ≤ m 2
if DQ*
ij ≥ m 2 ,

I then estimate the following ordered probit specification to test whether
economic distress stimulates religious intensity:
Pr (DQ ij p ⫺1FI ij) p Fqij(m 1 ⫺ bDE ij ⫺ (a 02 ⫺ a 01)
⫺ (a12 ⫺ a11) X ij ⫺ gFI
j ij),
Pr (DQ ij p 0FI ij) p Fqij(m 2 ⫺ bDE ij ⫺ (a 02 ⫺ a 01)
⫺ (a12 ⫺ a11) X ij ⫺ gFI
j ij) ⫺ Fqij(m 1 ⫺ bDE ij
⫺ (a 02 ⫺ a 01) ⫺ (a12 ⫺ a11) X ij ⫺ gFI
j ij),
Pr (DQ ij p 1FI ij) p 1 ⫺ Fqij(m 2 ⫺ bDE ij ⫺ (a 02 ⫺ a 01)
⫺ (a12 ⫺ a11) X ij ⫺ gFI
j ij),
where I ij p (1, X ij , g)
j and Fqij(7FI ijt) is normal. Equation (2) is the linear
approximation of the ordered probit specification. I estimate linear
probability, ordered probit, and probit specifications (when comparing
only increase vs. stay the same or decrease and decrease vs. stay the
same or increase). The incidental parameters problem is mitigated because I have 100 villages and 8,140 households, roughly an 80 : 1 ratio.
Even with individual fixed effects, a difference-in-differences framework correlating economic distress and changes in religious intensity
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may still lead to biased estimates because increases in religious intensity
will, in turn, mute the economic distress that stimulated it. Moreover,
omitted variables such as a propensity for taking fewer precautions may
be correlated with suffering greater economic distress and changes in
religious intensity.
To identify the causal impact of economic distress, I exploit the fact
that during a period of rapid inflation, demand for nonstaples tends
to fall more than demand for staples, so relative prices favor staple
growers. The price of rice increased by up to 280 percent, whereas in
comparison, prices of nonstaples increased by less or even depreciated
during the crisis (Levinsohn et al. 2003). The more rice a household
grows, the more cushioned it would be from the crisis. Therefore, the
amount of wetland a household owns before the crisis should be expected to cushion it from economic distress during the crisis.
In addition, rapid inflation tends to disproportionately affect workers
with sticky wages. In particular, government workers, whose wages are
set by federal law, are likely to suffer greater economic distress. Most
government workers in rural areas work in education or health, and
their basic salary is fixed by national law on the basis of their rank and
experience. Since government workers also own land (the average government household owns 0.56 hectare of dryland and 0.15 hectare of
wetland whereas the average nongovernment household owns 0.73 hectare of dryland and 0.17 hectare of wetland), the two instruments employ
complementary variation to estimate the causal effect of economic distress on religious intensity. The differential impact of the financial crisis
based on government occupation and wetland ownership has already
been documented by earlier studies of the Indonesian financial crisis
(e.g., Frankenberg, Thomas, and Beegle 1999; Knowles et al. 1999; Levinsohn et al. 2003).
The first-stage regression is
DE ij p p0 ⫹ p1 Z ij ⫹ p2 X ij ⫹ pj ⫹ hij ,

(3)

where Z ij represents the instruments, precrisis hectares of wetland
owned, and a precrisis government occupation dummy for individual i
in village j. The corresponding reduced-form regression is
DQ ij p b  Z ij ⫹ c ⫹ a  X ij ⫹ gj ⫹ ij .

(4)

The identification assumption is E(ij Z ij) p 0. The most important potential threat to this assumption is that the instruments, wetland hectares
and government occupation, may be correlated with omitted factors
that affect changes in religious intensity. To the extent that dryland
owners share unobservable characteristics with wetland owners and service workers share unobservable characteristics with government workers, examining the correlation between these “placebo” instruments and
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changes in religious intensity serves as one check of the identification
assumption. Second, wetland hectares and government occupation may
be associated with differential trends in religious intensity and economic
change that coincide with the financial crisis. To explore whether the
differential changes in religious intensity reflect differential trends, I
examine whether 1 year after the crisis, between two periods without a
crisis, the instruments are associated with either economic distress or
changes in religious intensity.
The basic idea behind the identification strategy can be illustrated in
a differences-in-differences framework. In table 1, I present summary
statistics by group that outline the identification strategy. The results
are imprecise because only a small part of the available information is
used. Columns 1 and 2 show the mean monthly per capita nonfood
expenditure before and after the crisis for different categories of wetland
hectares (greater than or less than 0.3 hectare) and whether or not the
household head works in government. These estimates are unconditional correlations and do not control for possible differentiating characteristics of household heads who work in government or of households
that own more wetland. For controls, see specification 1 and the estimates in the subsequent sections. Columns 3–5 show for each category
of wetland and government occupation the means of changes in
monthly per capita nonfood expenditure, pengajian participation, and
participation in nonreligious social activities. Two important features of
the data can be observed. First, households owning more wetland—
which, on average, suffered less economic distress—tend to decrease
pengajian relative to other households. Second, households in government occupations—which, on average, suffered greater economic distress—tend to increase pengajian relative to other households. Column
5 shows that the same pattern is not true for nonreligious social activities.
The Wald estimate (an imprecise instrumental variables estimator) of
the impact of economic distress on religious intensity is the ratio of
pengajian change and economic distress and can be obtained by dividing ⫺0.022 by 1.4 (⫺0.016) or 0.068 by ⫺4.8 (⫺0.014).
C.

First Stage: Relative Price Shocks and Differential Impact of the
Financial Crisis

Table 2 documents the relationship between wetland hectares and per
capita nonfood expenditure changes during the crisis using the specification in equation (3). On average, an additional hectare of wetland
corresponds to a $1.13 smaller decrease in per capita nonfood expenditures relative to other households (col. 5). Being in government corresponds to roughly a $2.04 larger decrease in per capita nonfood expenditures relative to other households (col. 5). The relationship holds

7.0
(.2)
12.9
(.6)
5.9
(.6)

7.5
(.2)
6.6
(.2)
⫺.9
(.4)

Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients display group means.

Difference

Government (N p 507)

Government occupation:
Not government (N p 7,633)

Difference

1 .3 hectare wetland (N p 1,398)

Wetlands:
≤ .3 hectare wetland (N p 6,742)

May 1997
(1)

2.6
(.2)
3.8
(.2)
1.2
(.7)

2.6
(.1)
3.0
(.6)
.5
(.4)

August 1998
(2)

Per Capita Nonfood
Expenditure ($/Month)

⫺4.4
(.2)
⫺9.1
(.6)
⫺4.8
(.9)

⫺4.9
(.2)
⫺3.5
(.6)
1.4
(.6)

Per Capita
Nonfood
Expenditure
Change
(3)

TABLE 1
Summary Statistics by Group

⫺.001
(.005)
.067
(.020)
.068
(.020)

.007
(.005)
⫺.015
(.013)
⫺.022
(.013)

Pengajian
Change
(4)

⫺.037
(.002)
⫺.009
(.011)
.029
(.008)

⫺.035
(.002)
⫺.037
(.005)
⫺.002
(.005)

Average
Nonreligious
Social
Change
(5)

No
No

1.24***
(.42)

Yes
Village

1.12***
(.36)

(2)

No
No

⫺4.76***
(.86)

(3)

Yes
Village

⫺2.00**
(.97)

(4)

Yes
Village

1.13***
(.36)
⫺2.04**
(.97)

(5)

Yes
Village

.036*
(.022)
⫺.154***
(.060)

Percentage
Change
(6)

.39***
(.15)
.19
(.58)
Yes
Village

Placebo
(7)

Yes
Village

⫺.32
(.46)
3.38***
(1.25)

Post
(8)

Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients represent OLS regressions. Control variables are household head and household characteristics listed as follows: household head
characteristics: age, years of education (8 p graduated), gender, ever married, literate, and follows media (television or radio); household characteristics: household size, modernity (index of stove,
radio, television, refrigerator, satellite dish, motorbike, and car), farming dummy, service dummy, dryland ownership (in hectares), and precrisis per capita nonfood expenditure. Percentage change
refers to per capita nonfood expenditure percentage change (August 1998 ⫺ May 1997). Placebo refers to the correlation of placebo instruments with per capita nonfood expenditure change
(August 1998 ⫺ May 1997). Wetland replaces dryland as a control. Post refers to the correlation of instruments with per capita nonfood expenditure change (May 1999 ⫺ December 1998).
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.

Controls
Fixed effects

Service

Dryland hectares

Government

Wetland hectares

(1)

Change in Per Capita Nonfood Expenditure
(August 1998 ⫺ May 1997; $/Month)

TABLE 2
First Stage: Correlation of Instruments with Impact of the Financial Crisis
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with and without controlling for household characteristics and village
fixed effects (cols. 1–4). The F-statistic of joint significance of wetland
hectares and government occupation is 7.16 in column 5. These results
corroborate earlier findings by Frankenberg et al. (1999) and Levinsohn
et al. (2003), who find that those who were able to grow rice were less
affected by the crisis as rice prices and spending on rice dramatically
increased. The results also corroborate findings by Knowles et al. (1999),
who find that government workers were more affected by the crisis since
their salaries tended to be inflexible in the short run.
Column 6 displays similar results when examining percentage changes
in per capita nonfood expenditures. For example, dividing the government expenditure change, $2.04, by the baseline, $12.90 (indicated in
col. 1 of table 1), gives roughly a 15 percent decline, the same percentage
decline indicated in column 6 of table 2. Changes in log expenditures,
however, do not give a statistically significant first stage for wetland.
Frankenberg et al. (1999) examine changes in log expenditures using
the IFLS and find that those whose main activity is agriculture were
relatively better off. It is possible that the poor, who often do not collect
wages in developing countries, report more poorly measured and noisy
expenditure numbers; this has been found to be the case in the United
States (Meyer and Sullivan 2007) and so may be expected to plague
developing countries more. This nonclassical measurement error may
bias estimates using logs, which emphasize the poorer part of the distribution. One must remain agnostic about exactly which form of economic distress stimulates religious intensity. Without additional instruments for each channel of causality, it is not possible to isolate the
potentially different effects of actual changes (sticker shock) versus percentage changes (relative changes) or per capita changes versus overall
changes, and so forth.
IV.
A.

Estimating the Impact of Economic Distress on Religious
Intensity
Reduced-Form Evidence

Do people who experience larger negative shocks relative to others
increase their religious intensity? To examine whether wetland owners
are less likely to increase religious intensity and whether government
workers are more likely to increase religious intensity, I estimate equation (4). Panel A in table 3 shows the main experiment. On average, a
hectare of wetland is associated with a 2-percentage-point greater likelihood of decreasing pengajian whereas government occupation is associated with a 6-percentage-point greater likelihood of increasing pengajian (cols. 1 and 3), suggesting that economic distress stimulates

No
No

⫺.000
(.009)

⫺.001
(.004)

Yes
Village

⫺.003
(.009)

.000
(.004)

⫺.019**
(.010)

⫺.019**
(.009)

⫺.029
(.019)
No
No

.023
(.016)

.068***
(.020)

(3)

(4)

(5)

⫺.013
(.026)
Yes
Village

⫺.003
(.009)
⫺.013
(.026)
Yes
Village

C. Postexperiment: May 1999

.006
(.016)

.000
(.004)
.006
(.016)

(6)
⫺.017**
(.008)
.048**
(.024)

.000
(.004)
.006
(.014)
Yes
Village

⫺.003
(.008)
⫺.008
(.022)

B. Placebo Experiment: August 1998

.057**
(.027)

⫺.020**
(.010)
.057**
(.027)

A. Main Experiment: August 1998

.000
(.008)
⫺.004
(.018)
Yes
Village

⫺.006
(.004)
⫺.001
(.012)

⫺.003
(.008)
.037
(.026)

Increase
vs. 0/⫺1
(7)

.005
(.008)
.009
(.022)
Yes
Village

⫺.005
(.004)
⫺.011
(.011)

.017***
(.006)
⫺.024
(.016)

Decrease
vs. ⫹1/0
(8)

Note.—Control variables are household head and household characteristics listed in table 2. In the placebo experiment, dryland control is replaced by wetland control. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Columns 1–5 display OLS estimates. Column 6 displays overall ordered probit marginal effects. Columns 7 and 8 display marginal effects for increasing and decreasing pengajian, which
are computed from probits comparing increasing vs. same/decrease and probits comparing decreasing vs. same/increase.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.

Controls
Fixed effects

Government

Wetland hectares

Service

Dryland hectares

Government

Wetland hectares

(2)

(1)

Pengajian Change in Past 3 Months (Increase ⫹1/Same 0/Decrease ⫺1)

TABLE 3
Reduced-Form Relationship between Instruments and Pengajian Change
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religious intensity. This relationship holds when I control for household
characteristics and village fixed effects (cols. 2 and 4).
Column 5 displays the joint estimation and column 6 displays the
overall ordered probit marginal effect.2 The estimates of marginal effects
in column 6 are very similar to the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates in column 5. I then compute the probit marginal effect for increasing (⫹1 vs. 0/⫺1) in column 7 and the probit marginal effect for
decreasing (⫺1 vs. 0/⫹1) in column 8. The differences between the
marginal effects in column 7 and the marginal effects in column 8 are
very similar to the OLS estimates in column 5. Moreover, columns 7
and 8 reveal that those who realize a high income shock relative to
others decrease their religious intensity during a crisis whereas those
who realize a low income shock relative to others increase their religious
intensity during a crisis.

B.

Placebo Experiment

In examining the causal impact of economics on religion, it is reasonable
to think that the financial crisis was neither an anticipation nor a consequence of religious fervor. However, several possibilities still threaten
the identification assumption. The most important potential problem
is that the instruments, wetland hectares and government occupation,
may be correlated with omitted factors that drive changes in religious
intensity. To test this possibility, I use dryland hectares and service occupation as “placebo instruments” for wetland hectares and government
occupation. To the extent that dryland owners share unobservable characteristics with wetland owners and service workers share unobservable
characteristics with government workers, examining the reduced-form
relationship between the placebo instruments and changes in religious
intensity serves as a check of the identification assumption.
The placebo instruments and the actual instruments share many observed characteristics and are therefore likely to share unobserved characteristics as well. Wetland and dryland hectare ownership are both
strongly associated with larger family sizes and with having fewer modern
amenities. Government and service workers are significantly more likely
to have graduated with 8 or more years of education, to be able to read
2

The overall marginal effect is calculated from
d
d
d
E(yFx) p P(y p 1Fx) ⫺ P(y p ⫺1Fx)
dx
dx
dx
since
E(yFx) p E(y p 1)P(y p 1Fx) ⫹ E(y p 0)P(y p 0Fx) ⫹ E(y p ⫺1)P(y p ⫺1Fx)
p P(y p 1Fx) ⫺ P(y p ⫺1Fx).
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and write, and to follow the radio or newspapers. Moreover, there is no
consistent pattern on the relative strength of the correlation between
the observed characteristics and the placebo and actual instruments,
except on one dimension, precrisis religious intensity.
Landownership is slightly positively correlated with precrisis household religious intensity, and government and service occupations are
slightly negatively correlated with precrisis household religious intensity,
but the placebo instruments are much more correlated with precrisis
religious intensity than the true instruments are. To the extent that
precrisis religiosity may be one of the most important determinants of
changes in religious intensity during the crisis, this finding suggests that
these placebos are a good choice. Appendix table B3 displays the results
for conditional orthogonality between precrisis religious intensity and
the instruments. Each cell represents a separate OLS regression of the
corresponding measure of religious intensity (described in App. A) on
each instrument, hectares of wetland owned, hectares of dryland owned,
government occupation dummy, and service occupation dummy. All
regressions are run at the individual level. Regressions that use villagelevel measures of religious intensity control for clustering at the village
level, and there does not appear to be a consistent pattern between the
instruments and village religious intensity.
Wetland and dryland differ on another important dimension: the
growing season. The wet season is from November to March, which
mitigates the concern that wetland owners were too busy to increase
pengajian during the 3-month window before August 1998, since field
preparation and planting, by far the most labor-intensive activities,
would have had to occur outside of May–August. Dryland crops have
much longer growing seasons, which increases the likelihood that dryland owners decrease pengajian because they are too busy, but as we
shall see, this is not the case.
Finally, wetland refers to any land that grows rice, so households
growing nonrice crops, such as corn, cassavas, sweet potatoes, peanuts,
and soybeans, would report owning dryland. In my sample, 66 percent
of households own dryland and 31 percent of households own wetland.
However, it is not the case that wetland and dryland can be found only
in different regions of Indonesia since 25 percent of households own
both wetland and dryland. This helps the identification strategy since
when I use village fixed effects, I can still observe differences in wetland
and dryland ownership within the same village.
Since the relative price of rice increased much more than the relative
prices of other food items (Levinsohn et al. 2003) and service workers
have more flexible wages than government workers, the placebo instruments should be less correlated with economic distress than the actual
instruments are. The pattern of economic distress is in fact much less
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pronounced for dryland hectares and service occupation. I estimate
equation (3) for the placebo instruments. An additional hectare of dryland mitigates the decrease in per capita nonfood expenditures by $0.39
(col. 7 of table 2), about a third of the effect ($1.13) of an additional
hectare of wetland owned (col. 5). Working in the service sector is
associated with much smaller and statistically insignificant $0.19 smaller
declines in per capita nonfood expenditures, whereas working in government is associated with a $2.04 larger decline (cols. 7 and 5).
Panel B of table 3 shows that the reduced-form relationship, specified
in equation (4), between the placebo instruments and pengajian change
during the crisis is almost nil in all specifications. If there are adjustment
costs (Chetty 2004) to choosing religious intensity, then small shocks,
such as those associated with dryland ownership and service occupation,
would not affect religious intensity. A striking contrast can be seen when
comparing the coefficients in column 5 for the true instruments with
the placebo instruments in panels A and B, and this contrast exists both
with and without controls (cols. 1 and 3). This finding alleviates the
concern that omitted variables associated with the instruments, wetland
hectares and government occupation, are correlated with changes in
religious intensity.
C.

Postexperiment

Wetland hectares and government occupation may also be associated
with differential trends in religious intensity and economic change that
coincide with the financial crisis. To explore whether the differential
changes in religious intensity reflect differential trends and provide
another check of the identification assumption, I examine whether 1
year after the crisis, between two periods without a crisis, the instruments
are associated with either economic distress or changes in religious
intensity. I use the change in pengajian recorded in May 1999 and the
difference between expenditures in May 1999 and December 1998 (I
am unable to use the panel wave that immediately follows the crisis wave
because pengajian is not recorded in December 1998). As can be seen
in figure 1, this period forms a natural control experiment since the
Rp/USD exchange rate moved little.
If the crisis was indeed responsible for the differential performance
of government workers and wetland owners, one should not expect the
same pattern of economic distress a year after the crisis. I estimate
equation (3) for this period after the crisis using the same precrisis
controls. Wetland hectares are associated with a statistically insignificant
$0.32 relative decline (col. 8 of table 2) compared to a $1.13 relative
improvement during the crisis (col. 5). Government workers actually
display a reverse pattern of distress as households recover from the
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financial crisis relative to others. They are associated with a $3.38 relative
improvement compared to other households (cols. 8 and 5). This does
not necessarily imply that government workers are recovering to precrisis levels. Their average monthly per capita nonfood expenditure in
May 1999 is $8.30 compared to $12.90 in May 1997. Nor are households
as a whole recovering completely from the crisis. The crisis summary
statistics in Appendix table B2 indicate only partial recovery on average.
Since government workers display a strong improvement relative to
others, we should expect a relative decrease in pengajian during this
period. I estimate equation (4) for wetland hectares and government
occupation a year after the crisis. Panel C of table 3 indicates that after
the crisis, neither the amount of wetland owned nor government occupation is strongly correlated with pengajian change. Government
workers display a negative coefficient for pengajian (col. 5). Dryland
hectares and service workers are not correlated with expenditure
changes or pengajian changes during this period. In sum, it does not
appear that differential trends in religious intensity associated with the
instruments, wetland hectares and government occupation, explain the
differential change in religious intensity.

D.

Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Estimates

In what follows, I use the exhibited pattern of distress to calculate the
impact of a dollar of per capita nonfood expenditure change on changes
in religious intensity. Table 4 estimates equation (2) for pengajian in
linear, ordered probit, and probit specifications.3 Column 7 suggests
that a $1.00 decline in per capita nonfood expenditure stimulates a 2percentage-point increase in the likelihood of increasing pengajian.
Since the average household suffered a $4.70 decline in per capita
nonfood expenditure out of a precrisis average of $7.33 (see App. table
B2; the median household suffered a $2.94 shock out of a precrisis
median of $4.75 monthly nonfood per capita expenditures), this suggests that economic distress caused the average household to become
9 percentage points more likely to increase pengajian during the crisis.
The consistency across controls suggests that remaining omitted variables bias may be small (compare cols. 3 and 4 with cols. 5 and 6). The
estimates of the linear probability model displayed in the first row are
very similar to the overall ordered probit marginal effects displayed in
the second row. Since pengajian is measured in changes and no precrisis
data on pengajian are available, it is difficult to interpret a household’s
3
I used Stata programs implementing Amemiya generalized least squares estimators for
probits with endogenous regressors. Newey (1987) provides the formulas used. I modified
these Stata programs to run ordered probits as well.

.0001
(.0003)
⫺.0002
(.0002)
⫺.0002
(.0002)
No
No
No

Per capita nonfood expenditure change

IV
(3)
⫺.016*
(.009)
⫺.015*
(.009)
.004
(.005)
.015**
(.007)
Wet
No
No

OLS
(2)
⫺.0003
(.0003)
⫺.0001
(.0001)
.0000
(.0002)
.0003
(.0002)
No
Yes
Village

⫺.015*
(.009)
⫺.003
(.009)
.015**
(.006)
Wet
Yes
Village

Ordered Probit

⫺.017*
(.010)

IV
(4)

⫺.014***
(.005)
⫺.009***
(.003)
.005
(.003)
Govt.
No
No

⫺.014***
(.005)

IV
(5)

⫺.024
(.016)
⫺.016
(.016)
.014
(.015)
Govt.
Yes
Village

⫺.028
(.019)

IV
(6)

⫺.018**
(.008)
⫺.008
(.008)
.014***
(.005)
Both
Yes
Village

⫺.021**
(.009)

IV
(7)

Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses. Control variables are household head and household characteristics listed in table 2. Overall ordered probit marginal effects are displayed. Marginal
effects for increasing and decreasing pengajian are computed from probits comparing increasing vs. same/decrease and probits comparing decreasing vs. same/increase.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.

IV
Controls
Fixed effects

Marginal effect for ⫺1 vs. 0/⫹1

Marginal effect for ⫹1 vs. 0/⫺1

.0001
(.0003)

Per capita nonfood expenditure change

OLS
(1)

Pengajian Change in Past 3 Months (Increase ⫹1/Same 0/Decrease ⫺1)

TABLE 4
Impact of Economic Distress on Pengajian (2SLS)
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9-percentage-point greater likelihood of increasing pengajian; however,
as noted in Appendix table B1, 9 percent of households increase pengajian and 9 percent of households decrease pengajian in August 1998.
This suggests that economic distress, as channeled through wetland
ownership and government occupation, could explain half of the increase in pengajian.
Importantly, the estimates using wetland hectares and government
occupation as separate instruments are very similar, which acts as an
overidentification test (compare cols. 3 and 4 with cols. 5 and 6). The
Sargan overidentification statistic is 0.299 and the p-value is 0.585, which
indicates that the null hypothesis of both instruments being exogenous
(or, more precisely, given the exogeneity of one instrument, the other
is also exogenous) to changes in pengajian cannot be rejected at the
10 percent level. Since instrumental variables (IV) estimates represent
only the change in behavior for those most affected by the instrument,
a priori, one could imagine that an estimate based on government
workers might represent only a small fraction of the population and
thus be difficult to generalize. However, a marginal unit of wetland
should benefit any household. Since the treatment effects for two very
different populations are so similar, it suggests that the estimated elasticity may be interpreted as one that represents the entire population.
Probit marginal effects for increasing (⫹1 vs. 0/⫺1) and decreasing
(⫺1 vs. 0/⫹1) religious intensity are displayed in the third row. When
the source of variation is hectares of wetland, doing better causes a
decrease in pengajian, as indicated by columns 3 and 4. When the source
of variation is government workers, larger economic distress causes an
increase in pengajian, as indicated by columns 5 and 6. The differences
between the marginal effects for increasing and the marginal effects for
decreasing are also similar to the estimates from the linear model in
row 1.
Columns 1 and 2 presents OLS estimates of equation (2). These
estimates of the correlation between economic distress and changes in
religious intensity are close to zero. The sign flips from column 1 to
column 2 as controls are added, which suggests that omitted variables
may play an important role. Moreover, measurement error in expenditures, which may be exacerbated in differences, also biases OLS estimates toward zero.
E.

Islamic Schools

Having established that economic distress stimulates pengajian, I now
turn to the other measure of religious intensity that is measured in
changes, sending one’s children to Islamic school, a measure that may
even have intergenerational ramifications. Returns to schooling at Is-
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TABLE 5
Impact of Economic Distress on Islamic School Attendance (2SLS)
OLS
(1)

OLS
(2)

IV
(3)

IV
(4)

A. Islamic School Attendance Change
Per capita nonfood expenditure change

.000
(.000)

Per capita nonfood expenditure change

.000
(.001)
No
No
No

⫺.000
(.000)

⫺.008*
(.004)

⫺.010*
(.006)

B. Secular School Attendance Change

IV
Controls
Fixed effects

⫺.000
(.001)
No
Yes
Village

⫺.005
(.008)
Both
No
No

.007
(.012)
Both
Yes
Village

Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses. Control variables are household head and household characteristics listed
in table 2. Islamic school attendance is defined as the number of children households send to Islamic schools. Only
households with children attending school before the crisis are included in the sample. Secular school attendance is
defined similarly.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.

lamic schools are lower than at non-Islamic schools (Berman and Stepanyan 2003), and in the Hundred Villages Survey, parents report paying substantially larger fees at Islamic schools than at non-Islamic
schools, so an increase in Islamic school attendance would be remarkable.
I find that households suffering greater economic distress increase
the number of children sent to Islamic schools and decrease the number
of children sent to secular schools. Only households that sent children
to school before the crisis are included in the sample, which reduces
the sample size to 4,255 households. Estimates suggest that households
that experience a $1.00 decline in per capita nonfood expenditures are
roughly 1 percentage point more likely to switch a child to Islamic school
(cols. 3 and 4 of table 5, panel A) and roughly 1 percentage point more
likely to switch a child from secular school (cols. 3 and 4 of table 5,
panel B). The estimates are not symmetric since households may also
take children into and out of school. Increases in Islamic school attendance are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The Sargan
overidentification statistic is 0.279 and the p-value is 0.597, meaning that
the null hypothesis of both instruments being exogenous to changes in
Islamic school attendance cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level.
The consistency across controls suggests that remaining omitted variables bias may be small (compare cols. 3 and 4). Replicating the placebo
and postexperiments for Islamic schools as in table 3 indicates that the
point estimates are a small fraction of the point estimates for the main
experiment (App. table B4), which serves as a check of the identification

326

journal of political economy

assumption for Islamic schools. The results are qualitatively similar using
the percentage of children attending Islamic school.4
The average household suffered a $4.70 decline, so the average
household was roughly 5 percentage points more likely to switch a
child to Islamic school, out of a baseline of 0.15 children per household attending Islamic school in May 1997, a sizable fraction. Islamic
schools also become relatively more expensive over the survey time
frame: parents pay a relatively constant $0.45 per month or 2 percent
of total expenditures (monthly per capita expenditure in May 1997
was $20.90) at non-Islamic schools, whereas the fee for Islamic schools
increased from being 35 percent higher in December 1998 to 80 percent higher than the fee for non-Islamic schools in August 1999. This
increase in Islamic school fees may reflect an increasing demand for
Islamic schools. It may also reflect increases in voluntary payments to
Islamic schools. According to an interview at one religious school in
a village in the Hundred Villages Survey, nominal minimal fees are
set, yet families can contribute any amount beyond the minimum.
Moreover, children who cannot afford school fees may be provided
scholarships, suggesting another form of consumption smoothing provided by religious schools.
Consistent with an increasing demand, according to a 1992 Library
of Congress report, an upper bound of 17 percent of the Muslim schoolage population attended Islamic schools in 1992.5 According to the IFLS
survey, conducted in 1997, 18 percent of Muslim households with children attending school have sent children to an Islamic school. But
according to a nationwide poll conducted in 1999, 30 percent of Muslim
households with school-aged children sent their children to an Islamic
school (Wagner 1999). These snapshots of time suggest that the financial
crisis coincided with a sharp increase in Islamic school attendance (consistent with Hartono and Ehrmann [2001]), which seems remarkable
because of potential long-term effects on children’s beliefs.

4
Identical results are also obtained if I run the standard specification analogous to eq.
(1):

Mijt p bEijt ⫹ a0t ⫹ a1t Xij ⫹ djt ⫹ ui ⫹ ijt
for t p 1, 2, i p 1, … , N, and j p 1, … , J, where Mijt represents the number of children
sent to Islamic school (madrasah) by household i in village j at time t, and per capita
nonfood expenditures Eijt are instrumented by Zij Postt. The variable Postt is a dummy
indicating whether the time period is after the crisis. Household fixed effects are represented by ui .
5
The upper bound of 17 percent results from dividing 15 percent, the overall percentage
of school-age population attending Islamic school in the Library of Congress report, by
87 percent, the proportion of the population that is Muslim.
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Other Social Activities

A question that naturally arises is whether pengajian captures religious
intensity or is just another social activity. In table 6, I compare pengajian
with all the other social activities that are surveyed. Column 1 displays
the earlier result (from col. 7 of table 4) that economic distress stimulates pengajian. Columns 2–6 indicate that economic distress stimulates
less participation in every other social activity surveyed in my data: sports
(olahraga), burial society (kematian), clubs for obtaining skills (karang
taruna), family welfare movement (PKK and “occasional training for
women”), and “10 helps for housing” (dasawisma). The information at
the bottom of table 6 indicates that three of the activities are also free,
suggesting that their smaller increase is not a result of activity fees.
Moreover, sports, clubs for learning skills, and PKK are also available
in 83–96 percent of villages. Since 83 percent of villages have Islamic
chapels or mosques, the small or no increase in other activities is not
due to the lack of available facilities.
This evidence suggests that opportunity cost of time (Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975; Gruber 2004; Gruber and Hungerman 2008) alone cannot explain the increase in religious intensity, since economic distress
should also stimulate other social activities. Significantly, column 7 of
table 6 indicates that economic distress does not stimulate participation
in another mutual insurance group, rotating savings clubs (arisan). This
result is consistent with the explanation that rotating savings clubs have
much weaker social sanctions than religious groups. Mean changes are
indicated in the third row of table 6. More people overall reported
decreasing rotating savings club participation (col. 7) than reported
increasing it, suggesting that mutual insurance groups without strong
social sanctions are in fact declining relative to pengajian.
G.

Labor Supply

Another question that naturally arises is whether pengajian increases
during the financial crisis reflect people having more leisure. In table
7, I examine whether wetland owners supply more labor and government workers supply less labor than others during the crisis; in particular, I estimate the reduced-form analogue of equation (4). Instead of
regressing
DL ij p b  Z ij ⫹ c ⫹ a  X ij ⫹ gj ⫹ ij ,
where DL ij indicates labor supply change for household i in village j, I
estimate the equivalent specification:
L ijt p b  Z ij Post t ⫹ a 0t ⫹ a1t X ij ⫹ djt ⫹ u i ⫹ ijt
for t p 1, 2, i p 1, … , N, and j p 1, … , J,

⫺.0064
(.0048)
⫺.043
Yes
Village
Fee

⫺.0207**
(.0091)
.003
Yes
Village
Free/
donation
No info.
71%
82%

Per capita nonfood expenditure change

No info.

⫺.0060
(.0055)
⫺.021
Yes
Village
Fee

⫺.0000
(.0002)

Burial
Society
(3)

83%

⫺.0001
(.0039)
⫺.032
Yes
Village
Small fee

IV

.0001
(.0002)

OLS

Club for
Learning
Skills
(4)

⫺.0009
(.0051)
⫺.052
Yes
Village
Usually
free
96%

.0001
(.0002)

Training
for Women
(5)

No info.

⫺.0012
(.0046)
⫺.037
Yes
Village
Free

.0001
(.0002)

10 Helps for
Housing
(6)

No info.

⫺.0043
(.0052)
⫺.028
Yes
Village
Free

.0004*
(.0002)

Savings
Club
Tea
Parties
(7)

Note.—OLS and IV specifications include all controls and village fixed effects. Instruments are wetland ownership and government occupation. Control variables are household head and
household characteristics listed in table 2.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.

% available
Islamic chapels available
Mosques available

92%

⫺.0001
(.0002)

⫺.0003
(.0003)

Per capita nonfood expenditure change

Mean change
Controls
Fixed effects
Cost

Sports
(2)

Koran
Study
(Pengajian)
(1)

Social Activities Participation Change in Past 3 Months
(Increase ⫹1/Same 0/Decrease ⫺1; August 1998)

TABLE 6
Impact of Economic Distress on Other Activities (2SLS)
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TABLE 7
Reduced-Form Relationship between Instruments and Labor Supply Change
Average Household Hours Worked/Week
(May 1997, August 1998)

Wetland#post

OLS
(1)

OLS
(2)

⫺.95**
(.39)

⫺.93**
(.39)

Government#post
Post
Controls
Fixed effects

21.21***
(.21)
No
Household

14.99***
(2.22)
Yes
Household

OLS
(3)

3.19***
(.81)
20.83***
(.21)
No
Household

OLS
(4)

OLS
(5)

⫺1.13
(1.06)
15.40***
(2.22)
Yes
Household

⫺.92**
(.39)
⫺1.09
(1.06)
15.00***
(2.22)
Yes
Household

Note.—Control variables are interactions of a dummy for postcrisis with the previous controls, household head and
household characteristics, and village fixed effects, listed in table 2. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.

where Post t is a dummy variable indicating whether the time period is
after the crisis, L ijt indicates labor supply for household i in village j in
time t, and u i represents household fixed effects (the notation is like
that of eq. [1]). This specification highlights the overall labor supply
change for the entire population, captured in a 0. Previous regressions
are not run this way because pengajian data are available only in changes.
The coefficient on Post t in table 7 indicates that all households increased labor supply, as measured by average household hours worked
per week. The magnitudes suggest that people are switching from home
production to market production. This is consistent with Frankenberg
et al.’s (1999) finding that female employment increased during the
crisis and that a large number of women joined the informal workforce
or family businesses (including working on the family farm). In fact,
dividing 21 (coefficient on Post t in col. 1) by 7 days a week and multiplying by the average number of working-age household members
(4.16 average household size ⫺ 1.79 average number of children in
school p 2.37) gives an increase in labor supply of just over 7 hours a
day, equivalent to perhaps one woman per household leaving home
production and entering the workforce. Columns 1 and 3 indicate that
those who were hit harder by economic distress increased their labor
supply relative to others (suggesting a backward-bending labor supply),
inconsistent with the notion that pengajian increases because people
have more leisure. With controls, the coefficient for wetland remains
significant, but not for government workers.6
6
Controlling for ownership of modern amenities particularly affects the coefficient on
government workers. One possible explanation is that owners of modern amenities may
have access to additional means of increasing household labor supply.
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Does Religious Intensity Function as Ex Post Social Insurance?

Sections III and IV establish that economic distress stimulates religious
intensity. But neither a decrease in the opportunity cost of time nor
extra leisure time appears to explain the increase in religious intensity:
there is a minimal corresponding increase in any other social activity,
and labor supply does not decrease for households more affected by
the crisis. In fact, it is not that people on the margin reduce labor and
increase religious intensity but that they increase labor, and within nonlabor allocation, they substitute toward religion.
In this section, I now turn to the evidence that religion provides ex
post insurance, consistent with the model discussed in Section II. Some
of the benefits of religious insurance groups may be in-kind, such as
the matching of the unemployed to employers, so I do not rely on data
on transfers between households, which the Hundred Villages Survey
does not contain, in presenting evidence that households receive aid
from religious groups immediately after increasing their religious intensity. I show that (1) an increase in religious intensity, within 4 months,
alleviates household need for credit; (2) households with alternative
forms of credit available do not increase their religious intensity in
response to economic distress; (3) households with additional religious
institutions available have smaller variance in their consumption shocks
due to the crisis; (4) religious institutions mitigate the effect of the
income shocks on consumption shocks; and (5) religious institutions
smooth consumption shocks particularly for households that were previously less religious before the crisis.
A.

Do Religious Institutions Provide Aid Ex Post?

Households that increase religious intensity during the peak of the crisis
reduce the likelihood of being credit constrained. A household is considered as needing alms or credit to meet basic daily needs if it does
not have basic supplies for next week or a supply of money; so in order
to get food, family members are waiting for a package, (trying to) borrow
from someone else, or waiting for someone to give (the variable construction is described in greater detail in App. A). As this information
is asked only after the crisis, I examine whether pengajian participation
affects credit constraints by using a differences-in-differences strategy
that compares credit constraints at the peak of the crisis with those for
a few months afterward. In table 8, I present summary statistics by group
that is similar to the organization of table 1. Columns 1 and 2 show the
mean level of credit constraints in August and December of 1998, for
different categories of pengajian activity: increase, constant, decrease,
or no participation in the 3 months before August 1998. Column 3
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TABLE 8
Evidence Suggesting Religious Intensity Functions as Social Insurance: Credit
Constraints by Group (August 1998)
Credit Constrained

Increase participation (N p 753)
Constant participation (N p 3,509)
Decrease participation (N p 728)
No participation (N p 3,148)
Difference (N p 8,138)

August
1998
(1)

December
1998
(2)

Change
in Credit
Constraints
(3)

.039
(.007)
.043
(.003)
.034
(.007)
.052
(.004)
⫺.004
(.002)

.020
(.005)
.032
(.003)
.028
(.006)
.049
(.004)
⫺.009
(.002)

⫺.019
(.008)
⫺.010
(.004)
⫺.007
(.009)
⫺.003
(.005)
⫺.005
(.003)

Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients display group means. Difference displays the regression
coefficient of the change in credit constraints on participation, where increase participation p 4, constant participation
p 3, decrease participation p 2, and no participation p 1.

shows the means of changes in likelihood of being credit constrained
for each category of pengajian activity.
Several important features of the data can be observed. Households
that increase participation in Koran study during the crisis (May–August
1998) see a 49 percent reduction in the likelihood of needing alms or
credit 4 months later (in December 1998), whereas households that
report constant Koran study are 23 percent less likely to need alms or
credit 4 months later and households that decrease participation see a
21 percent reduction in the likelihood of needing alms or credit 4
months later. Households that did not participate in pengajian are only
6 percent less likely to need alms or credit 4 months later. The final
row in table 8 presents an imprecise estimator of the impact of pengajian
on credit constraints by regressing the change in credit constraints on
pengajian activity, where increase participation p 4, constant participation p 3, decrease participation p 2, and no participation p 1. I
find that each category of pengajian activity reduces credit constraints
by 0.5 percentage points shortly after the peak of the financial crisis.
Two features of the data suggest that mean reversion is not the reason
for the differential reduction in credit constraints during the crisis,
where those who were hardest hit may be most likely to increase religious
intensity, yet naturally most improve in credit constraints thereafter.
First, nonparticipating households, which were the most credit constrained, show the smallest decline in needing alms or credit 3 months
later. Mean reversion would predict these households to have the biggest
decline in credit constraints. Second, rates of credit constraints among
households are diverging after the crisis. In August 1998, the percentage
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of households that were credit constrained varied from 3.4 percent to
5.2 percent among the different groups by pengajian activity, and in
December 1998, the percentage of households that were credit constrained varies in a larger range, from 2.0 percent to 4.9 percent, but
mean reversion would predict convergence in the rate of credit constraints.
These findings of ex post aid are not limited to these measures of
religious activity or economic welfare. Results for Islamic school attendance are analogous: households that increase Islamic school attendance have greater reductions in the likelihood of needing alms or
credit than households with constant or decreasing Islamic school attendance. Similar results are found using nonfood expenditures as the
outcome variable instead of credit constraints.
Elsewhere, I have noted anecdotal evidence from personal interviews
of religious groups providing aid after negative shocks are revealed.
Pengajian groups simultaneously increase attendance and provide public announcements to aid those seeking jobs or workers. Islamic schools
induce higher attendance with scholarships for families who can no
longer afford public school fees. Together, these pieces of evidence
corroborate the notion that religious intensity alleviates needing alms
or credit to meet basic needs.
B.

Does Religious Intensity Increase in Response to Lack of Credit?

The model described in Section II suggests that religious intensity does
not respond to economic distress if alternative forms of consumption
smoothing are available. To investigate this hypothesis, I estimate
DQ ij p b 0 DE ij ⫹ b1(DE ijC j) ⫹ a 0C j ⫹ a1 X ij ⫹ gj ⫹ ij ,
where C j represents credit availability in village j, and credit availability,
according to residents of Indonesia, is defined as having banks, microfinance institutions, or BRI loan products. The BRI bank system is
the backbone of the rural financial system in Indonesia (Holloh 2001),
and BRI loan products are a special form of credit (with reduction of
interest for timely repayments) with low collateral requirements. According to one interview at a village in the Hundred Villages Survey,
BRI loan products were especially available during the crisis for government workers because they were considered to have “fixed” jobs.
Microfinance programs were also helpful for laid-off workers to start
small businesses of their own (AKATIGA 1999).
The coefficient of the interaction DE ijC j indicates whether the effect
of economic distress on religious intensity decreases with the availability
of credit. The coefficient is negative and significant. The estimate is
robust to specifications with and without controls (cols. 1 and 2 of table
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TABLE 9
Evidence Suggesting Religious Intensity Functions as Social Insurance: Credit
Pengajian Change in Past 3 Months
(August 1998)

Per capita nonfood expenditure
change
Per capita nonfood expenditure
change#credit availability

IV
(1)

IV
(2)

IV
(3)

IV
(4)

⫺.018***
(.007)

⫺.037***
(.014)

⫺.026
(.022)

⫺.024*
(.013)

.021***
(.008)

.030**
(.013)

.030*
(.018)

Per capita nonfood expenditure
change#number of shops per
1,000 population

(.021)
(.071)

Per capita nonfood expenditure
change#urban

⫺.011
(.026)

Per capita nonfood expenditure
change#size of village

⫺.005
(.006)

Per capita nonfood expenditure
change#village population

⫺.012
(.031)

Per capita nonfood expenditure
change#high savings
Controls
Fixed effects

No
No

Yes
Village

Yes
Village

.025*
(.014)
Yes
Village

Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses. Instruments are wetland ownership, government, their interaction with
credit availability (in cols. 1–3), their interaction with listed village characteristics (col. 3), and their interaction with
high savings (col. 4). Credit availability is defined as having a bank, microfinance, or BRI loan product available in the
village. High savings is defined as those villages that have an above-median fraction of households with savings. Control
variables are household head and household characteristics listed in table 2.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.

9). Dividing 0.30 by 0.37 in column 2 suggests that credit availability
reduces the effect of economic distress on religious intensity by roughly
80 percent. When I cluster standard errors at the village level to account
for the fact that credit availability is measured at the village level, this
reduction remains statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The
Sargan overidentification statistic is 3.610 and the p-value is 0.461, which
indicates that the null hypothesis that the instruments interacted with
credit availability are exogenous to changes in pengajian cannot be
rejected at the 10 percent level. Credit availability also reduces the effect
of economic distress on switching children from secular to Islamic
schools, but the effect is not statistically significant.
To address the possibility that credit availability proxies for general
economic development, I employ two strategies: one that includes ad-
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ditional control variables that may proxy for economic development
and a second that uses an alternative measure for credit availability. In
the first strategy, I include interactions between economic distress and
the number of shops, an urban dummy, size of village, and village population, respectively. The standard errors of the coefficients of interest,
b 0 and b1, increase (in col. 3), and the magnitudes do not change much
(the coefficients indicate that credit availability effectively eliminates the
effect of economic distress on religious intensity). This suggests that
there is something particular about credit availability, not economic
development, that influences how economic distress stimulates religious
intensity. In the second strategy, I use reports by village heads of the
fraction of households in the village that have savings as an alternative
measure of credit availability. In column 4, I use the interaction of
economic distress with an indicator for whether the village is above the
median in the fraction of households that have savings. I find that credit
availability reduces the effect of economic distress on religious intensity
by roughly 100 percent. When I cluster standard errors at the village
level, this reduction remains statistically significant at the 10 percent
level.
Religious intensity may have increased most where insurance is lacking. Remarkably, the proportion of households participating in pengajian increased from 47 percent to 73 percent from August 1998 to
August 1999 where there were no Islamic chapels or mosques. Elsewhere, the proportion of households participating in pengajian increased only from 64 percent to 71 percent. Similar statistics are found
for villages with and without credit availability and for villages with or
without many households that save (App. table B1). Pengajian participation increased from 60 percent to 71 percent in villages without credit
but increased from 63 percent to 72 percent in villages with credit.
Pengajian participation increased from 60 percent to 73 percent in
villages with low savings but increased from 62 percent to 70 percent
in villages with high savings.
Having shown that religious intensity increases in response to lack of
credit and that religious intensity alleviates credit constraints, I now turn
to tests of social insurance provision by religious institutions at the village
level.
C.

Do Religious Institutions Smooth Consumption Shocks?

Up to this point, the paper has examined household responses to economic distress and household measures of religious intensity. In this
subsection, I examine the effect of religious institutions on a villagelevel measure of economic distress: if religious institutions provide social
insurance, villagers will smooth more of their consumption shocks with
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each other. So did the crisis have a smaller impact on the spread of
consumption changes in places where there were more religious institutions? To test this hypothesis, I identify an exogenous component of
the financial crisis based on the village-level version of the instrument—
the Gini coefficient of wetland hectares. Since wetland hectares cushion
household economic distress, the Gini coefficient of wetland ownership
within a village identifies the inequality of economic cushioning during
the crisis. In this subsection, I ask whether this exogenous crisis component (Gini coefficient of wetland) interacted with the precrisis number of worship buildings is negatively associated with the impact of the
crisis on the standard deviation of consumption shocks.
The model described in Section II suggests the following reducedform specification:
Crisis_Stdev(DE ij)j ⫺ Noncrisis_Stdev(DE ij)j p
b 0 Ij ⫹ b1 Ij Sj ⫹ a 0 Sj ⫹ a1 X j ⫹ kp ⫹ hjp ,
where Stdev(DE ij)j is constructed by calculating each household’s
change in monthly per capita nonfood consumption expenditures and
then computing the village-level standard deviation of these consumption shocks; Crisis_Stdev(DE ij)j is computed using the consumption
shocks during the financial crisis; Noncrisis_Stdev(DE ij)j is computed
using consumption shocks during the postexperiment described earlier.
The standard deviation captures consumption smoothing among villagers. Differencing addresses potential fixed omitted variables associated
with village consumption smoothing. The term Ij represents the villagelevel instrument, the Gini coefficient of wetland hectares, and Sj represents potential social insurance institutions, total number of worship
buildings per 1,000 population, 1996–97 INPRES (Presidentially Instructed Program for Village Assistance) funds per 1,000 population,
and credit availability, as well as characteristics about the village that
may be plausibly correlated with both religious worship buildings and
the standard deviation of consumption shocks during the crisis. The
term X j represents village and geographic controls (urban dummy, population, area, number of shops per 1,000 population, mean precrisis
monthly per capita nonfood expenditures, and dummies for geographic
characteristics flat, steep, beach, forest, valley, and river), and kp represents province fixed effects.
In the previous subsection, I showed that credit availability lowered
the effect of economic distress on religious intensity. Here, using an
analogous specification, I ask, Do worship buildings lower the effect of
the wetland Gini coefficient on the standard deviation of consumption
shocks? As a preliminary step, I first show that there is a strong reducedform relationship between the wetland Gini coefficient and the standard
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TABLE 10
Evidence Suggesting Religious Intensity Functions as Social Insurance:
Consumption Smoothing among Villagers
Change in Standard Deviation of
Consumption Shock

Wetland Gini

OLS
(1)

OLS
(2)

OLS
(3)

OLS
(4)

18.08**
(7.97)

40.58***
(12.85)
⫺7.47**
(3.75)

24.35***
(8.43)

25.89
(23.24)
⫺8.99*
(4.68)
21.48
(16.63)
43.20
(26.53)
21.16
(26.13)
23.60
(30.84)
⫺14.41
(18.46)
⫺57.21
(42.40)

No
No

No
No

Yes
Province

Yes
Province

Wetland Gini#worship buildings
per 1,000 population
Wetland Gini#1996–97 INPRES
funds ($/1,000 population)
Wetland Gini#credit availability
Wetland Gini#urban
Wetland Gini#number of shops
per 1,000 population
Wetland Gini#size of village
Wetland Gini#1996–97 INPRES
economic funds ($/1,000
population)
Village, geographic controls
Fixed effects

Note.—Village-level regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses. Controls are village and geographic characteristics listed below. Wetland Gini refers to the Gini coefficient of wetland ownership. Change in standard deviation of
consumption shock is computed by considering the per capita nonfood consumption expenditure shock households
received between two periods over the crisis and taking the standard deviation of those household shocks for each
village. Then the same standard deviation of consumption shocks is computed for two periods without an intervening
crisis, the periods used for the postexperiment earlier in the paper. The difference between the crisis standard deviation
and the noncrisis standard deviation is the variable of interest. Standard deviation captures consumption smoothing in
a village. Differencing addresses potential fixed omitted variables associated with consumption smoothing. Columns 1
and 3 show that wetland Gini is strongly associated with a larger standard deviation of consumption shocks during the
crisis. Columns 2 and 4 display the coefficients of interest. Village characteristics: urban, population, size, number of
shops per 1,000 population, and mean precrisis per capita nonfood expenditures. Geographic characteristics: flat, steep,
beach, forest, valley, and river.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.

deviation of consumption shock due to the financial crisis (cols. 1 and
3 of table 10).
The coefficients of interest, b 0 and b1, are displayed in columns 2 and
4. The negative sign on the interaction of the wetland Gini coefficient
and worship buildings suggests that religious institutions facilitate consumption smoothing among villagers. The average number of religious
worship buildings per 1,000 population is 3.83 (App. table B1, village
summary statistics). Multiplying 3.83 by the coefficient 7.47 and dividing
by 40.58 (col. 2) suggests that the average number of religious worship
buildings reduced the effect of the financial crisis on the standard deviation of consumption shock by roughly 70 percent. Comparing columns 2 and 4 suggests that the relationship is robust to adding village
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and geographic controls and province fixed effects. In particular, column 4 shows that religious worship buildings significantly reduce the
standard deviation of consumption shocks even when the interactions
between the wetland Gini coefficient and, respectively, INPRES funds,
credit availability, urban dummy, number of shops per 1,000 population, village size, and INPRES funds directed to economic activity are
controlled for. The relationship is not robust, however, to using the
coefficient of variation or interquartile range of village consumption
changes. The reason may be that the mean of consumption shocks
during the noncrisis period is very small, and dividing by them makes
the noncrisis numbers extremely large.
Having provided some evidence of social insurance provision by religious institutions at the village level, I now turn to the question of
whose consumption shocks are being insured by religious institutions.
Using data on household religious intensity before the crisis, I conduct
a test of whether the consumption smoothing by religious institutions
is ex ante or ex post.

D.

Do Religious Institutions Smooth Individual Consumption Shocks?

In this subsection, I begin by examining whether religious institutions
reduce the effect of income shocks on consumption shocks, a standard
income-consumption-translation test of insurance (Townsend 1994; Dehejia et al. 2007). The methodology developed in the previous subsection provides evidence of spatial insurance at the village level; here, I
use wetland hectares and government occupation as instruments for
income shocks at the household level and interact them with precrisis
religious institutions to see if the latter mitigates household consumption shocks. I find that each hectare of wetland results in a $3.41 cushion,
but the average number of worship buildings per 1,000 population reduces this cushion by $2.17, suggesting that the average number of
religious worship buildings reduced the effect of the financial crisis on
economic distress by 64 percent (table 11, col. 4). Government occupation results in a $2.13 exacerbation from the crisis, and the average
number of worship buildings per 1,000 population mitigates this shock
by $0.81; however, these point estimates are not statistically significant.
I report conditional correlations, but unconditional correlations give
similar results (col. 2). When I cluster standard errors at the village
level, this reduction remains statistically significant at the 10 percent
level. Religious institutions mitigate not only the effect of income shocks
during the crisis but also the effect of income shocks after the crisis,
reducing the effect of income shocks on the household standard deviation of consumption shocks across the four waves of data.
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TABLE 11
Evidence Suggesting Religious Intensity Functions as Ex Post Social
Insurance: Consumption Smoothing among Villagers
Change in Per Capita Nonfood Expenditure ($/Month;
August 1998 ⫺ May 1997)

Wetland hectares
Wetland hectares
#worship buildings per 1,000
population
Wetland hectares
#worship buildings per 1000
population
#religious
Controls
Fixed effects

OLS
(1)

OLS
(2)

OLS
(3)

OLS
(4)

OLS
(5)

OLS
(6)

1.24***
(.42)

3.74***
(.89)
⫺.64***
(.20)

1.12***
(.36)

3.41***
(.78)
⫺.57***
(.17)

4.83***
(1.08)
⫺.92***
(.26)

4.63***
(.94)
⫺.88***
(.22)

.71*
(.43)

.78**
(.33)

No
No

Yes
Village

No
No

No
No

Yes
Village

Yes
Village

Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses. Control variables are household head and household characteristics listed
in table 2. Religious households are those that attended the haj or Islamic school before the crisis. Columns 1 and 3
show that wetland hectares are strongly associated with the experience of economic distress during the crisis. Columns
2 and 4 show that the association between wetland ownership and economic distress during the crisis is mitigated with
the presence of worship buildings. Columns 5 and 6 show that worship buildings mitigate the experience of distress
due to lack of wetland ownership primarily for those who were not religious before the crisis.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.

1.

Do Religious Institutions Provide Ex Ante Insurance?

So far, I have provided evidence of social insurance by religious institutions, but what about ex post insurance postulated by the model described in Section II: Are nonreligious individuals able to increase religious intensity after the crisis and receive smoothing for this increase?
Neither credit availability nor precrisis measures of religious institutions
at the village level provide definitive answers to the question of ex ante
or ex post insurance. That households that increase in pengajian had
a greater reduction in credit constraints 4 months later is consistent
with ex post insurance, but increasing pengajian suggests that the household was participating beforehand anyway; moreover, the finding that
non-pengajian participants saw no reduction in credit constraints is consistent with either ex ante or ex post insurance.
One test of consumption smoothing consistent with a dynamic ex
ante insurance story, where individuals increase their posterior beliefs
on uncertainty, is whether economic distress stimulates religious intensity more when the dispersion of shocks increases. A greater dispersion
of shocks might lead individuals to believe that there is greater uncertainty in the economic environment. There is some evidence that economic distress stimulates more Koran study and Islamic school atten-
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TABLE 12
Evidence Suggesting Religious Intensity Functions as Ex Post Social
Insurance: The Role of Prior Religiosity and Inequality
Pengajian Change in Past 3 Months (August 1998)

Wetland hectares
Wetland hectares
#religious

OLS
(1)

OLS
(2)

OLS
(3)

OLS
(4)

OLS
(5)

OLS
(6)

⫺.036***
(.010)

⫺.046***
(.011)

⫺.024**
(.010)

⫺.068**
(.032)

⫺.085**
(.034)

.006
(.038)

.120***
(.028)

.108***
(.029)

.038
(.027)
.070*
(.042)
No
No

.076*
(.044)
Yes
Yes

⫺.034
(.048)
Yes
Village
fixed
effects

Wetland hectares
#wetland Gini
Household controls
Village, geographic
controls

No
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
Village
fixed
effects

Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses. Control variables are household head and household characteristics listed
in table 2. Village and geographic controls are listed below. Religious households are those that attended the haj or
Islamic school before the crisis. Wetland Gini refers to the Gini coefficient of wetland ownership. Columns 1 and 2
show that households lacking wetland hectares, which is strongly associated with the experience of economic distress
during the crisis, increased their Koran study during the crisis, but only among the nonreligious. Columns 4 and 5
show that where incomes are more unequal, Koran study increases more with economic distress. Village characteristics:
urban, population, size, number of shops per 1,000 population, and mean precrisis per capita nonfood expenditures.
Geographic characteristics: flat, steep, beach, forest, valley, and river.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.

dance in areas with a high Gini coefficient of wetland than in areas with
a low Gini coefficient of wetland (table 12, cols. 4 and 5). However, the
point estimates are not statistically significantly different when village
fixed effects are included (col. 6).
An additional test of consumption smoothing consistent with a dynamic ex ante insurance story is whether households that were already
religious are the ones that increase religious intensity in response to
their economic shock. In fact, there is weak evidence that the opposite
is true. Households that were religious before the crisis, measured as
those in which a household member attended the haj or Islamic school,
decrease pengajian if they suffered greater economic shock (table 12,
cols. 1 and 2). The estimates weaken in statistical significance but do
not switch signs with the inclusion of village fixed effects (col. 3). It
does not appear to be the case that households that were already religious before the crisis were the ones that increased religious intensity
in response to economic distress.
2.

Do Religious Institutions Provide Ex Post Insurance?

To test for the provision of ex post insurance, I examine whether religious or nonreligious households benefit from the consumption
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smoothing provided by religious institutions. I proxy for a household’s
religiosity before the crisis using data on whether a household member
attended the haj or Islamic school. Thirteen percent of households
report having a household member who attended Islamic school or the
haj before the financial crisis (App. table B1). I find that nonreligious
households are the ones that benefit from religious institutions’ consumption smoothing. For households that were not religious before the
crisis, the average number of religious worship buildings reduced the
effect of the financial crisis on consumption shock by 73 percent
(3.83 # ⫺0.88/4.63). For households that were religious before the
crisis, the average number of religious worship buildings reduced the
effect of the financial crisis by 8 percent (3.83 # [⫺0.88 ⫹ 0.78]/4.63).
This finding is robust to the inclusion of household controls and village
fixed effects (table 11, cols. 5 and 6).
Moreover, under the rough assumption that precrisis households participate in pengajian if a household member attended the haj or Islamic
school (it is not possible to pinpoint whether pengajian increases reflect
changes on the intensive or extensive margin since precrisis pengajian
information is unavailable), government workers appear to have joined
pengajian studies whereas wetland owners decreased preexisting pengajian studies. In addition, as shown in Appendix table B2, pengajian
participation increased by 17 percentage points from August 1998 to
August 1999 for households that do not own the Koran, whereas it
increased by only 8 percentage points for households that do own the
Koran. This evidence taken together suggests that it is the less religious
households that increase their religious participation during the crisis
and receive consumption smoothing for that increase.
E.

Alternative Theories

In this subsection, I consider several alternative theories to explain the
findings in this paper.
1.

Distress

While some of the social insurance evidence does suggest an economic
aspect to pengajian activity, it is generally difficult to disentangle economics from distress in a situation of economic distress. I therefore test
whether pengajian responds to shocks that are more distressing than
economic shocks—family deaths (infants)—and find that infant deaths
do not increase pengajian. This suggests that economic distress, not just
any distress, is responsible for pengajian increases. It also makes it less
likely that religious intensity merely provides solace or moral, emotional,
and psychological support. This may seem counterintuitive to the com-
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mon notion that bad times stimulate religious feeling. However, casual
observation suffers from a self-selection problem in reports: the econometrician does not observe all people who suffer distress even if the
religiously intense claim that distress stimulates religiosity. A priori, distress is equally likely to decrease religious intensity.
2.

Altruism

The provision of ex post insurance looks quite similar to redistributive
altruism, but two aspects of the data are inconsistent with redistributive
altruism. First, religious institutions are not associated with lower inequality of consumption levels, which poses the question why religious
institutions would altruistically smooth temporary shocks but not permanent inequality. Ex post social insurance, however, allows the smoothing of temporary and not permanent shocks. Second, altruism fails to
explain why only those who participate in pengajian experience alleviation of credit constraints during the crisis and why it is only after
increasing pengajian that households experience the greatest alleviation
of credit constraints.
3.

Poverty

My empirical framework finds that an economic shock causes an increase in religious intensity, but by itself, it does not rule out poverty
causing religious intensity. In other words, if religious intensity were
pegged to income levels instead of income volatility, this could also
explain why economic distress stimulates religious intensity. However,
religious intensity increases as economic conditions improve after the
crisis: pengajian participation rates continue to increase from 61 percent
in August 1998 to 71 percent in August 1999 (App. table B2), and the
separation between religion and state decreased several years after the
crisis (Indonesia elected a Muslim cleric as president in October 1999,
and new federal laws mandated that all schools provide Islamic prayer
rooms and all children be taught in their respective religion).
A model of social insurance, however, is consistent with an increase
in religious intensity even after economic conditions improve. A large
shock increases an agent’s posterior likelihood of a volatile income
distribution. If a large shock stimulates religious intensity, might a small
shock, too, and shouldn’t religious intensity therefore necessarily correspond to income levels as shocks become arbitrarily small? However,
if there are adjustment costs (Chetty 2004) to choosing religious intensity, then small shocks would not affect religious intensity. In fact, dryland hectares, an instrument for a small shock, are not correlated with
changes in religious intensity. Finally, other studies do not peg religious
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intensity to income levels: Krueger and Maleckova (2003) do not find
that poverty causes terrorism, and DiPasquale and Glaeser (1998) do
not find that poverty matters for race riots. Neither is there a relation
between pengajian and monthly per capita nonfood expenditures in
the cross section in my sample. Because the poor are not more religious,
these findings are also inconsistent with wealth-dependent levels of risk
aversion.
4.

Inferior Goods

I argue that economic distress not stimulating other social activities is
inconsistent with an opportunity cost view of religion that does not
account for religious activity having an economic component not present in other social activities. However, it may also indicate that most
social activities are luxury goods. Following this line of argument, if
social activities are luxury goods, then to explain why participation in
nonreligious social activities declined during the crisis, income effects
outweigh substitution effects. This would imply that Koran study is an
inferior good, and since the relative price of Islamic schools increased,
Islamic schooling is a Giffen good. Very few Giffen goods have been
documented, so it would be remarkable if Islamic schooling is a Giffen
good like rice and potatoes ( Jensen and Miller 2008). Moreover, religious intensity being an inferior good is inconsistent with the general
lack of correlation between religious intensity and income as noted in
the previous subsection and in Iannaccone (1998).
5.

Labor Bonding

An alternative explanation for the increase in religious intensity and
the concomitant reduction in economic distress is that religious organizations can bond labor: religious organizations may provide a form
of work and give money because they can prevent individuals from
leaving in a future period. Sending children to Islamic boarding school
is one way, but not the only way, to conceptualize this. Whether religions
bond labor is similar to the hypothesis that religions purchase religiosity
and some are more likely to sell than others, specifically the poor. Two
aspects of the data suggest that the bonding of labor is not a good
explanation in this case. First, if religious organizations bond labor, then
labor supply will be less backward bending where there are more religious institutions. Households in distress should be better able to sell
future labor to religious organizations and so do not need to work as
hard in the present period. However, the opposite is true: labor supply
is more than twice as backward bending in places with a per capita
number of worship buildings above the median than below the median,
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although the difference is not statistically significant. Second, if religious
organizations bond labor, landless households with few child labor opportunities should be particularly inclined to send their children to
Islamic boarding schools. However, landownership is associated with
decreases in household size.
6.

Contentment

Finally, religious intensity may merely increase contentment instead of
provide ex post insurance. If so, the decrease in credit constraints may
be due to households simply needing less to meet their basic daily needs.
Increased contentment may not only reduce consumption but may even
reduce the effect of positive income shocks on positive consumption
shocks and be consistent with religious institutions reducing the standard deviation of consumption shocks within a village. But increased
contentment has a much greater difficulty explaining two other features
of the data. First, religious institutions reduce the effect of negative
income shocks on negative consumption shocks. Households that increase contentment and lower their consumption needs should have
displayed even greater declines in consumption expenditures in response to negative income shocks. Second, it is the households that
were less religious before the crisis that become more religious and see
the largest smoothing of consumption shocks by religious institutions.
If households that were less religious are the ones that increase contentment the most, these would also be the households that should see
the largest declines in consumption. Third, households increase religious intensity in response to economic distress but not general distress,
as measured by infant deaths. It is therefore difficult to square this
evidence with a view that religion is a form of emotional welfare and
those who are down on their luck want more welfare.
VI.

Conclusion

In this paper, I test a social insurance model of religious intensity. I
demonstrate that economic distress stimulates religious intensity by exploiting the fact that rapid inflation causes relative prices to favor growers of staples, namely rice, and hurt sticky wage earners, particularly
government employees, whose salaries are set by federal law. I find that
households experiencing a $1.00 decline in monthly per capita nonfood
expenditures are 2 percentage points more likely to increase Koran study
and 1 percentage point more likely to switch a child to Islamic school.
These results do not obtain for “placebo instruments,” dryland hectares
and service occupation. Any counterexplanation for rice growers and
government employees displaying changes in religious intensity must
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address why the same changes are not seen for growers of dryland crops
and workers in service occupations.
Participation in other social activities, including rotating savings
groups, does not increase, and labor supply increases with economic
distress. These findings are inconsistent with an opportunity cost view
of religious intensity that does not account for social insurance. Instead,
using a difference-in-differences strategy, I show that households that
increase pengajian during the crisis have less unmet demand for alms
and credit for meeting basic daily needs within 4 months. Households
that did not participate in pengajian are the most credit constrained
and show the least reduction in credit constraints within 4 months.
Moreover, the effect of economic distress on religious intensity essentially disappears in places where credit is available. Religious institutions
also facilitate consumption smoothing across and within households:
they reduce the spread of consumption shocks within a village and
mitigate the effect of negative income shocks on consumption shocks
within a household. These results are more consistent with a social
insurance model in which religion fills a missing market for credit than
with alternative theories for religious intensity.
Finally, religious institutions mitigate the effect of negative income
shocks mainly for households that were not particularly religious before
the crisis. Together with the finding that it is the less religious households that increase religious intensity in response to economic distress
and the finding that households increasing in religious intensity show
the greatest reduction in credit constraints, my results are consistent
with an ex post model of social insurance. I speculate that religion is a
risk-sharing mechanism in which people pool their resources and redistribute the pool according to their relative religious intensities. It is
as if people choose a proportion of income to put in religious groups
and this proportion represents their religious intensity. The pool is then
divided according to how much people contribute as a fraction of their
income. The model has the empirical implications that those who are
hit harder by economic distress will increase their religious intensity
and those who are hit less hard will decrease their religious intensity.
The effect should be mitigated when other forms of credit are available.
Religious institutions facilitate consumption smoothing between and
within households. People can receive ex post insurance, meaning that
sharing occurs after information is revealed rather than before, by increasing their religious intensity, but strong social sanctions against relative lack of intensity facilitate the stability of ex post insurance by deterring people who receive positive shocks from participating less.
Alternative social insurance mechanisms with weak sanctions, such as
rotating savings groups, would decline during economic distress. This
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paper presents evidence of the ex post insurance dimension; the social
sanctions dimension is presented in other work (Chen 2005, 2007).
Religious intensity is linked more strongly to social violence in regions
that are more economically distressed (Chen 2005), and alternative
social insurance attenuates the causal effect of economic distress on the
link between religious intensity and social violence (Chen 2007). To the
extent that governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations are concerned about ideological extremism, in
particular because it may lead to religious conflict and violence, these
results suggest that increasing their role in social insurance may mitigate
fundamentalist tendencies. Indeed, there is evidence that religious intensity is lower in places where there is greater public funding, particularly funding that provides social insurance (Gruber and Hungerman
2005; Hungerman 2005). Countries inordinately dependent on natural
resources may be subject to greater fluctuations and may find reducing
fundamentalist tendencies to be yet another reason to diversify. Economic shocks have been found to increase conflicts (Miguel, Satyanath,
and Sergenti 2004; Miguel 2005), so if globalization increases the risk
that individuals face, providing insurance against that risk may be important in preventing ethnic-religious conflicts.
Social scientists increasingly view group identities like ethnicity as
social constructs potentially affected by an individual’s environment and
economic conditions. Religious intensity provides a particularly apt context to study group identity since it is arguably more of a choice than
ethnicity. I have provided evidence for a model in which social insurance
with punishment is particularly successful in an uncertain environment.
This may help explain why some religions and group identities replace
others over time. If one models group identities as a form of social
insurance (Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Fryer 2003; Chen and Li 2009),
then in the long-run competition between social insurance groups, with
volatility, religions and ethnic identities with harsher punishment are
more stable and successful. As volatility declines, groups or religions
with reduced punishment or violence become relatively successful. Violence should be interpreted broadly since it need not be physical. The
mere exclusion or harassment of nongroup members (Chen and Sethi
2009), much less the concept of hell common in many religions or
discrimination in many ethnicities or nationalities, substitutes for violence that keeps ex post insurance self-sustaining. Given the variation
in doctrine, the content of beliefs and the interpretation of religious
and legal texts may in fact be subject to economic forces (Greif 1994;
Montgomery 1996; Glaeser and Scheinkman 1998; Chen and Lind
2006).
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Appendix A
Data
The empirical analysis draws from the Hundred Villages Survey, collected by
the Indonesian Central Statistics Office. The panel data set follows 8,140 households from May 1997 to August 1999, beginning before the crisis and continuing
in four waves after the crisis (fig. 1). In the precrisis period, the survey observes
120 randomly selected households in each of 100 communities. A codebook in
Bahasa discusses the sampling, saying that the surveyors initially sampled two
enumeration areas per village in 1997, with 60 households per enumeration
area. In 1998, they wanted to represent more of the village, so in the villages
where there were more than two enumeration areas (i.e., areas that they had
not yet sampled), they randomly sampled a third enumeration area, randomly
dropped 20 households from each of the previous two enumeration areas, and
then added a new enumeration area with 40 households. The partial replacement of precrisis households explains why the panel contains 8,140 instead of
12,000 households.
Roughly one-third of the treatment groups left the sample during resampling;
however, the attrition rates are similar across the treatment and placebo groups:
28 percent of those owning wetland and 28 percent of those owning dryland
left the sample; 34 percent of those not owning any wetland and 39 percent of
those not owning any dryland; and 31 percent of government workers, 37 percent
of service workers, 32 percent of nongovernment workers, and 32 percent of
nonservice workers.
The survey also collects village-level information in the first wave of 1997 and
1998. A more detailed description of the survey questions and variable construction used in the tables is provided below. The survey is in Indonesian and was
translated with the help of two translators.
Information on wetland and dryland hectares is taken from the question that
asks for the total area that is owned of each of wetland and dryland. Government
occupation is taken from the question “Status of main job last week,” where the
choices are working by ourselves without other’s help, working with other’s help
from temporary worker, working with permanent worker, government staff, public staff, private worker, and family worker. Government and public staff are
coded as government worker. In Indonesian, the answer choices for government
worker are “Buruh/karyawan pemerintah” and “Buruh/karyawan BUMN/
BUMD.” Service occupation is taken from the question “Main job during last
week,” where the choices are agriculture, mining, industry, electricity, construction, business, transportation, finance, service, and other.
I focus on two outcome measures for changes in religious intensity, DPij . One
measure is the response to “In the past 3 months, has your household increased,
decreased, stayed the same, or not participated in the study of the Koran (pengajian)?” More precisely, the phrase is “pengajian/kegiatan agarma lainnya,”
which translates to religious activity; however, translators say that the question
would be interpreted by native Indonesians as specifically referring to Koran
study; non-Muslims may interpret the question as referring to the equivalent in
their respective religion. This question is asked after the crisis and is coded as
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⫺1/0/⫹1. The other measure is the change in the number of children in the
household attending Islamic school. Islamic school attendance is coded as follows. Individuals older than 5 are asked the question “level of highest education
that have ever had,” which includes the responses elementary, ibtidaiyah (Islamic), secondary school, tsanawiyah (Islamic), junior high/vocational, high
school, aliyah (Islamic), diploma I/II, diploma III/bachelor, and diploma IV/
graduate.
Economic distress, DE ij , is measured using the per capita monthly nonfood
consumption expenditure change from May 1997 to August 1998. Monthly nonfood expenditures are obtained from the question “Total nonfood expense last
month.” Dividing this number by the household size gives the per capita information. Expenditures are normalized to U.S. dollars to ease interpretation. Exchange rate data come from http://www.oanda.com. The results are qualitatively
the same using a CPI index, which comes from http://www.bi.go.id/bank
_indonesia_english/main/statistics.
The controls, X ij , include precrisis May 1997 values as follows: household head
characteristics: age, years of education (1–8 where 8 p graduated), gender (1
p male, 0 p female), ever married (1 p married, divorced, or widowed; 0 p
not married yet), literate (able to read and write), and follows the media (listened to radio or read newspaper last week); household characteristics: household size, modernity (sum of dummy indicators for the ownership of a stove,
radio, television, refrigerator, satellite dish, motorbike, and car), dryland hectares, farming dummy, service worker dummy, and last month’s per capita nonfood expenditures; village characteristics: urban dummy, population, area, and
number of shops per 1,000 population; geographic characteristics: dummies for
flat, steep (the excluded topography dummy is slight angle), beach, forest, valley,
and river terrain (the excluded geography dummy is other); and fiscal characteristics: total IDT (a village assistance program) funds received by the average
household between 1994 and 1996 and INPRES (implemented during 1996–
97) funding received normalized to dollars per 1,000 population, which divides
into funds used for productive economic effort, for buildings and facilities, for
offices and institutions, and for human resources.
Participation in other social activities is asked alongside the question on Koran
study. Each question follows the same format: “In the past 3 months, has your
household increased, decreased, stayed the same, or not participated in . . . ?”
is coded as ⫺1/0/⫹1. Same and not participated are coded as 0. The questions
are asked in the following order: family welfare movement (occasional training
for women), a program called “10 helps for housing” (a form of rotating savings
group of 10 households in the same neighborhood but whose function is primarily social), a national club designed for common people with the purpose
of obtaining useful abilities (considered as a practical nonformal school for
adults), burial society, sports, Koran study, and savings clubs (whose meetings
are tea parties). Participation in Koran study, savings clubs, 10 helps for housing,
and family welfare movement is free. Participation in sports, burial society, and
clubs to obtain skills requires fees. According to the village-level survey, 92 percent of villages have sports clubs, 83 percent have clubs for obtaining skills, 96
percent have family welfare movement organizations, 71 percent have Islamic
chapels, and 82 percent have mosques. Labor supply information is obtained
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by taking the mean of each household member’s “total hours of any work during
last week” and computing the change of this mean between pre- and postcrisis
periods.
Credit availability is defined as having a bank, microfinance institution (response to the question on “lembaga keu”), or BRI loan product (response to
the question on “kupedes”) available in the village. Standard deviation of village
shock refers to the standard deviation of individual changes in nonfood expenditures over the crisis. A household is considered as needing alms or credit to
meet basic daily needs if (1) the head responds that the household does not
have basic supplies (response to the question on “mempunyai persediann sembako,” which roughly translates to “nine basic needs”) for next week or a supply
of money (response to the question on “mempunyai persediaan uang”); and so
(2) in order to get food (response to the question on “cara memperoleh bhn
makanan pk”), they are waiting for a package, (trying to) borrow from someone
else, or waiting for someone to give. This information is asked only after the
crisis.
Village-level religiosity measures of per capita number of mosques, Islamic
chapels, churches, Hindu temples, and Buddhist temples are taken from the
1997 PODES data (Potensial Desa [Village Potential Statistics]), which present
1996 information. The religiosity measures of the per capita number of Islamic
boarding schools, religious schools, and seminaries are taken from the 1998
PODES. New religious schools and seminaries are unlikely to have been built
during the crisis, so I interpret both pieces of data as precrisis numbers and
divide by the 1997 PODES population accordingly (1998 PODES population
numbers would be affected by crisis-induced migration).
I use the entire sample of 8,140 households. Appendix table B1 presents some
descriptive statistics.

Appendix B

TABLE B1
Descriptive Statistics
Household Summary Statistics

Village Summary Statistics

Percentage own wetland

31%

Percentage own dryland

66%

Percentage in farming

66%

Wetland ownership (hectares)

.17
(.01)
.72
(.01)

Dryland ownership (hectares)

Standard deviation of village
consumption shock during
crisis (August 1998–May
1997)
Standard deviation of village
consumption shock noncrisis (May 1999 ⫺ December 1998)
Total worship buildings per
1,000 population
Religious schools per 1,000
population
Seminaries per 1,000
population

11.42
(1.56)
9.22
(2.16)
3.83
(.28)
.12
(.04)
.01
(.01)

TABLE B1
(Continued )
Household Summary Statistics
Surname indicates haj
pilgrimage
Number of children attending
Islamic school
Monthly per capita food expenditure, May 1997
Monthly per capita nonfood
expenditure, May 1997
Household size
Government worker
Service worker
Religious (attended the haj or
Islamic school before crisis)
Observations

Village Summary Statistics
1.0%
.15
(.01)
14.6
(.1)
7.3
(.2)
4.16
(.02)
6%
10%
13%

% pengajian participation in
village, August 1998
Credit available
Number of shops per 1,000
population
Urban
1996–97 INPRES funds in
$/1,000 population
Observations

.61
(.03)
.34
(.05)
.07
(.03)
.20
(.04)
.91
(.09)
99

8,140

TABLE B2
Crisis Summary Statistics

Monthly per capita nonfood expenditure,
change
Pengajian participation rate (%)
Pengajian increase in last 3 months (%)
Pengajian decrease in last 3 months (%)
Pengajian participation in villages with
credit available (%)
Pengajian participation in villages without
credit available (%)
Pengajian participation in villages with high
savings (%)
Pengajian participation in villages with low
savings (%)
Pengajian participation in households owning the Koran (%)
Pengajian participation in households owning no Koran (%)

August
1998

December
1998

May
1999

August
1999

⫺4.7
(.2)
61
9
9

1.1
(.2)
Unavailable
Unavailable
Unavailable

⫺.1
(.2)
67
7
10

.2
(.2)
71
7
11

63

Unavailable

71

72

60

Unavailable

65

71

62

Unavailable

70

70

60

Unavailable

62

73

65

Unavailable

69

73

50

Unavailable

62

67

TABLE B3
Correlation of Instruments and Precrisis Religious Intensity
Wetland
(Hectares)
(1)

Dryland
(Hectares)
(2)

Government
(3)

Service
(4)

A. Household Religious Intensity
Surname indicates a haj
pilgrimage
Number of children attending Islamic school
Number of adults who attended
Islamic school
Controls
Fixed effects

.001
(.002)

.006***
(.001)

⫺.003
(.007)

⫺.011***
(.004)

.013
(.016)

.007
(.005)

⫺.007
(.036)

⫺.021
(.021)

.021**
(.010)
Yes
Village

.010***
(.004)
Yes
Village

⫺.039
(.025)
Yes
Village

⫺.009
(.015)
Yes
Village

B. Village Religious Intensity
Mosques in village per 1,000
population
Islamic chapels per 1,000
population
Churches per 1,000 population
Hindu temples per 1,000
population
Buddhist temples per 1,000
population
Islamic boarding schools per
1,000 population
Religious schools per 1,000
population
Seminaries per 1,000 population
Controls
Fixed effects

.036
(.050)

.039*
(.020)

.172*
(.095)

.028
(.059)

⫺.079
(.145)
.156
(.110)

.033
(.065)
⫺.009
(.013)

⫺.136
(.278)
⫺.109
(.067)

.112
(.172)
⫺.032
(.037)

.012*
(.007)

.001
(.002)

⫺.004
(.018)

⫺.007
(.006)

⫺.002
(.001)

.001
(.001)

⫺.004
(.006)

⫺.004
(.004)

.002
(.009)

.006
(.004)

.018
(.020)

.004
(.012)

.019
(.024)
⫺.002
(.002)
Yes
Province

.002
(.008)
.002
(.002)
Yes
Province

⫺.021
(.031)
.004
(.005)
Yes
Province

.034**
(.016)
.006
(.005)
Yes
Province

Note.—Each coefficient represents a separate OLS regression on an instrument, conditional on controls and fixed
effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. All controls are precrisis May 1997 values. Controls in panel A are household
head and household characteristics listed below. Controls in panel B are household head, household, village, geographic,
and fiscal characteristics listed below. Measures in panel B are collected at the village level, so the corresponding
regressions control for village-level clustering and have province fixed effects. Household head characteristics: age, years
of education (8 p graduated), gender, ever married, literate, and follows media (television or radio). Household
characteristics: household size, modernity (index of stove, radio, television, refrigerator, satellite dish, motorbike, and
car), farming dummy, service dummy, dryland ownership (hectares), and precrisis per capita nonfood expenditure.
Column 2 controls for wetland ownership (hectares) instead of dryland ownership (hectares). Village characteristics:
urban, population, size, number of shops, and mean precrisis per capita nonfood expenditures. Geographic characteristics: flat, steep, beach, forest, valley, and river. Fiscal characteristics: 1996–97 INPRES funds per 1,000 population
for economic activity, building and facilities, offices and institutions, human resources, and IDT funds.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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TABLE B4
Reduced-Form Relationship between Instruments and Islamic School
Attendance
Islamic School Attendance Change
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

A. Main Experiment: August 1998
Wetland hectares

⫺.0150
(.0154)

Government

Dryland hectares

.0440*
.0451
(.0259)
(.0394)
B. Placebo Experiment: August 1998
⫺.0144***
(.00506)

Service

Wetland hectares

⫺.0259
(.0180)

⫺.00324
(.00595)
.0193
.0165
(.0216)
(.0231)
C. Postexperiment: May 1999

.0141
(.0103)

.00823
(.0128)

Government
Controls
Fixed effects

No
No

Yes
Village

⫺.0192
(.0167)
No
No

⫺.0133
(.0263)
Yes
Village

⫺.0262
(.0180)
.0459
(.0394)
⫺.00324
(.00595)
.0162
(.0231)

.00833
(.0128)
⫺.0135
(.0263)
Yes
Village

Note.—Control variables are household head and household characteristics listed in table 2. In the placebo experiment, dryland control is replaced by wetland control. Standard errors are in parentheses. Columns 1–5 display OLS
estimates. Islamic school attendance is defined as the number of children households send to Islamic schools. Only
households with children attending school before the crisis are included in the sample.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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